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Navigating EU Law and the Law of 
International Arbitration 
by G E O R G E A. BERMANN * 
ABSTRACT 
The European Union and international arbitration are two robust legal regimes that have 
managed to develop largely in accordance with their own respective first principles'', and they 
have accordingly thrived. This article initially explains why that has been the case. 
But the era of parallelism between the regimes has ended, and rather suddenly. This article 
identifies the two principal fronts on which tensions between EU law and international 
arbitration law have emerged. Interestingly, both commercial and investment arbitration are 
implicated. 
A first front entails a conflict between the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) expansive 
notions of EU public policy and two well-established axioms of international commercial 
arbitration law: first, that public policy must be construed narrowly when invoked as a ground 
for annulling an award or denying it recognition and enforcement; and second, that parties in 
arbitration are expected to raise all substantive arguments pertinent to their claims or defences 
in the course of the arbitral proceedings and not reserve them for post-award relief from a 
disappointing award. A second front finds EU Member States invoking their obligations under 
EU law as a defence — sometimes jurisdictional, sometimes substantive — in investor-State 
tribunals. The paradigm argument is that EU law mandates withdrawal of an illegal state aid 
in reliance on which an investor entered that market. 
This article examines two prevailing methodologies for addressing these tensions, in arbitral 
tribunals themselves as well as in reviewing courts. It concludes that many such tensions — 
particularly those along the first front — may be resolved through accommodation techniques 
well-established in other areas of the law. Others, particularly those arising in the investor-
State context, resist resolution in that way and are requiring decision-makers to face the 
uncomfortable prospect of making one of these legal regimes cede ground to the other. The ECJ 
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and investor-State tribunals are understandably inclined to prioritise the regimes differently, 
with the ultimate outcome falling to member state courts which owe allegiance to both regimes. 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Up to now, European Union law and the law of international arbitration have 
largely occupied separate worlds.1 To describe their relationship as one of mutual 
indifference would scarcely be an overstatement. The past, in which these two 
bodies of law coexisted, each following its separate and distinctive logic, looks 
today like something of an age of innocence. 
This pattern is changing, however, as European Union law and international 
arbitration law find themselves in greater contact and increasingly in conflict. So 
far, the conflict between these two legal regimes has taken two distinct shapes-
First, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has lately advanced a particularly 
far-reaching notion of EU public policy that, while not in itself problematic, 
challenges a central premise of international arbitration law, namely that public 
policy must be narrowly construed when invoked as a ground for annulling arbitral 
awards or denying them recognition or enforcement. This particular conflict 
typically arises when EU Member State courts are asked to deny effect to an 
otherwise valid award on the ground that it offends an EU public policy norm. 
Second, Member States may be required under EU law to take action that 
places them at risk of violating their obligations under international investment 
treaties, thus exposing them to liability at the hands of investor-State arbitral 
tribunals. In this scenario, it is not only Member State courts that face competing 
EU law and investment law claims; investment arbitration tribunals face them 
as well. 
These two developments - each in its own way — have heightened EU law's 
stakes in international arbitration and, reciprocally, international arbitration's 
stakes in EU law. The stakes are not only more apparent, but now also more 
conflictual, than ever. This article explores the nature of these two sets of conflicts. 
It observes that both require careful and considered navigation between the 
demands of competing legal orders. It further concludes that though these conflicts 
present real challenges, neither of them defies resolution. On the other hand, while 
the two sets of conflict emanate from the same pair of legal orders, they are 
distinctive and cannot satisfactorily be approached in entirely the same fashion. 
I conclude that conflicts stemming from the unusually robust notion of EU 
public policy lend themselves to what might be called a traditional 
'accommodation' strategy, whereby one or both of two competing legal orders 
relaxes its demands sufficiently to accommodate the demands of the other. But 
accommodation strategies go only so far in addressing the second set of conflicts I 
have identified, namely those resulting from clashes between EU law and the law 
See generally, Natalya Shelkoplyas, 'The Application of EC Law in Arbitration Proceedings', (2004); 
Theodore C. Theofrastous, 'International Commercial Arbitration in Europe: Subsidiarity and Supremacy in 
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of investor protection. At least in some circumstances, conflicts of this sort require 
arbitral tribunals and courts to confront, more or less head-on, the relative 
authority of the two contending legal orders. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I serves as background, describing the 
circumstances that for over a half century have permitted EU law and 
international arbitration law to follow their separate logics largely without 
interference from the other. Parts II and III then examine the two species of 
conflicts between EU law and international arbitration law that have recently 
emerged. Part II in particular traces the development of an expansive notion of 
EU public policy and its consequences for international arbitration. Part III then 
demonstrates that the Member States, under pressure from EU law, are taking 
measures of dubious legality under international investment law, as enforced by 
investment arbitration tribunals. The developments identified in these two Parts 
have increasingly disturbed the pattern of peaceful coexistence between EU law 
and international arbitration law that has so long prevailed; in some regards, these 
developments place the two regimes on a veritable collision course. 
Part IV explores whether and, if so, how the demands flowing from these two 
previously disengaged legal orders may be accommodated without undue sacrifice 
to their respective value systems. I conclude that courts have gone a great distance 
in defusing the tensions by deploying time-honoured accommodation strategies. 
Such strategies have proven especially effective in coping with the pressures that 
the notion of EU public policy has placed on the international arbitration system. 
This operation has been remarkably smooth, considering that it has required 
altering the way in which public policy has commonly been conceived. Rather 
than attach the label of public policy to a particular norm and proceed to treat 
every breach of that norm as, ipso facto a violation of public policy, courts now 
increasingly make offence to public policy turn instead on the magnitude and 
seriousness of the breach. In other words, courts are becoming ever more 
comfortable with the notion that a norm may enjoy public policy status within EU 
law without its every breach constituting a violation of EU public policy. 
Accommodation strategies also have utility in resolving conflicts between the 
demands of EU law and the international investor protection system. Investment 
tribunals in particular have proven to be quite deft at interpreting the mandates of 
these competing international legal regimes in ways that render them compatible. 
But while accommodation strategies provide an exit path from some normative 
dilemmas in the investment arena, they do not do so in all cases. Due to the way in 
which tensions between EU law and investment arbitration law have recendy been 
framed, arbitral tribunals and courts can scarcely avoid addressing more frontally 
the relationship between the competing legal orders. Indications thus far suggest 
that, in that confrontation, the European Union may be required to make 
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I. T H E D I S T A N T WORLDS OF EU A N D 
INTERNATIONAL A R B I T R A T I O N LAW 
The year 1958 saw the entry into force of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community,2 forerunner of today's Treaty on European Union,3 a 
treaty pursuant to which the EU has made its presence felt ever more 
conspicuously on Europe's political, economic and legal landscape. That same 
year also marked the signature of a quite different international treaty - the United 
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (better known simply as the New York Convention)4 - that has become the 
cornerstone of an increasingly robust international arbitration regime. Each of 
these treaty arrangements pursues its own distinct policy objectives supported by a 
distinctive set of 'first principles' calculated to ensure its effectiveness. 
Notwithstanding the contemporaneity of these two treaties, the fields of EU law 
and international arbitration law have largely failed to intersect. This failure is 
probably due more to EU law's assumptions about international arbitration than 
vice versa, which is not to say that EU law harbours any particular distrust of 
arbitration, much less views arbitration itself as in contradiction with EU law and 
policy.5 In theory, arbitration merely offers another forum for giving effect to EU 
law in private legal relations,6 and to mat extent serves EU law's purposes. But if 
EU law is not inhospitable to international arbitration, it has nevertheless kept it at 
arm's distance, due primarily to three distinct factors: first, the gulf that has long 
separated EU law and private international law; second, the exclusion of 
arbitration cases from the Brussels Regulation, which is the EU's principal legal 
instrument for regulating judicial jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters; and 
third, die ineligibility of arbitral tribunals to make preliminary references to the 
2 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 220(4). 
3 Treaty on European Union (TEU), 1992 OJ. C 191/1 (July 29, 1992). In fact, most matters traditionally 
covered in the Community treaties are now dealt with, not in the Treaty on European Union, but in the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 2010 OJ. C 83 (Mar. 30, 2010). 
4 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (1959). 
However, the European Commission has been said to show some suspicion of arbitration, regarding it, at least 
in the antitrust arena, 'as an instrument for evasion of competition law and Commission enforcement policy.' 
Shelkoplyas, supra n. 1 at 422. 
'The need for the recognition of an independent and alternative system to litigation, such as arbitration, is 
important both for the direct implementation of Article 81 of the EC Treaty [now TFEU Article 101] in 
accordance with the scope of the Commission White Paper and to share the load of cases concerning 
competition disputes.' Georgios I. Zekos, Antitrust/Competition Arbitration in EU versus U.S. Law', 25 J. of 
Int'lArb. 1, 29 (2008). As Zekos has written elsewhere, '[i]t is questionable if arbitral tribunals can serve as a 
means to evade the application of certain EU laws such as competition rules. For example, the parties to an 
arbitration agreement would agree to exclude issues of EU law from their dispute so that arbitrators would not 
rule on these matters. The enforcement of arbitral awards would be contrary to public policy since there is a 
breach of a direcdy applicable rule.' Georgios I. Zekos, 'The Treatment of Arbitration Under EU Law', 54 
Disp.Res. J. 9(1999). 
For its part, the European Court of Human Rights has given arbitration a generalised blessing, remarking 
that 'a waiver of [access to national courts] is frequendy encountered both in civil matters, notably in the shape 
of arbitration clauses in contracts . . . ,' and adding that such a waiver, 'which has undeniable advantages for 
the individual concerned as well as for the administration of justice, does not in principle offend against the 
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ECJ on the meaning or validity of EU law measures. I discuss each of these three 
considerations in turn. 
(a) EU Law and Private International Law 
Widely viewed as a branch of private international law, international arbitration 
did not historically resonate with the EU's core concerns. Though European 
Union law has come with time to range over a remarkably wide variety of fields, 
private international law was for a long period distinctly not among them. From 
the start, constitutional and administrative law occupied a conspicuous place in the 
landscape of EU law, alongside a host of substantive law domains that the 
architects of the EU specifically targeted: agriculture, fisheries and transport law; 
a common commercial policy; competition law; and of course the establishment of 
a common market (later the internal market) more generally. Treaty amendments 
later brought whole new subject matters within the purview of EU law; 
environmental7 and consumer protection8 and occupational safety and health are 
only the most conspicuous examples. In fact, over time, pursuit of internal market 
objectives potentially brought EU law into virtually any field — even a core private 
law field - in which harmonization of Member State law plausibly stood to render 
the EU market more fully integrated.9 Product liability was an early, and remains 
the paradigmatic, example of private law harmonization in aid of market 
integration.10 
From other fields, such as private international law, however, EU law 
traditionally maintained a distance. This distance reflected the fact that the 
Community was not originally conceived of as governing purely private legal 
relations. Disputes under Community law were accordingly not expected to give 
rise to very much arbitral adjudication. The original EEC Treaty expressly 
contemplated that any harmonization in the field of private international law 
would proceed outside the framework of EU law and, more particularly, through 
a wholly separate convention to be entered into by the Member States. It 
anticipated in this connection separate agreements on international jurisdiction 
and the enforcement of foreign country judgments among the Member States, for 
example,11 and it was on this basis that the Member States eventually entered into 
the critically important 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.12 
Even when the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht finally brought private international 
law within the ambit of EU law, it relegated the field to the EU's then so-called 
'third pillar' on justice and home affairs, which operated purely inter-
governmentally, rather than according to the so-called Community method that 
7 TFEU, supra n. 3, art. 191, 
8 Id., art. 169. 
9 /rf.,art. 114. 
0 Council Directive 85/374/EEC, 1985 OJ. L 210 (Aug. 7, 1985), as amended by Council and Parliament 
Directive 1999/34/EC, 1999 OJ. L 141/20 (June 4, 1999). 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, supra n. 2, art. 220. 









orial Library user on 06 February 2020
402 Arbitration International, Volume 28 Issue 3 
governed action in the more mainstream 'first pillar,'13 which entailed qualified 
majority voting among the Member States in the Council, executive authority in 
the European Commission, and judicial review by the European Court of Justice. 
Only with the 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam14 was private international law finally 
integrated into the first pillar, with the result that mat the 1968 Brussels 
Convention was transformed into Community legislation, in the form of Council 
Regulation 44/2001,1 5 a directly applicable EU law instrument. 
(b) The Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation 
The 1968 Brussels Convention was not only entered into outside the Community 
law framework,16 but also contained an express exclusion for jurisdiction and 
judgments in arbitration cases.17 This exclusion did a good deal more than place 
the exercise of adjudicatory authority by arbitral tribunals beyond the Convention's 
reach; it also excluded matters ofjudicial jurisdiction and the judicial recognition or 
enforcement of prior judgments, when the underlying claim or judgment 
pertained to arbitration — whether arbitration agreements, arbitral proceedings or 
arbitral awards. As a result, none of the typical judicial actions relating to 
arbitration - such as suits to enforce arbitration agreements, applications for 
interim relief in aid of arbitration, actions for the annulment of local awards, and 
suits to enforce foreign arbitral awards - fell within the scope of the Brussels 
Convention, even though, but for the arbitration connection, such litigation 
qualified in every other respect for Convention treatment.18 
The arbitration exception was a rational one. By the time the Brussels 
Convention was concluded in 1968, the New York Convention was already a 
decade old.19 Although the New York Convention did not, and still does not, 
comprehensively govern the role of courts in relation to arbitration agreements 
and arbitral awards, it addressed core issues, such as the obligation of national 
courts to refer parties to arbitration20 and to grant recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards.21 The drafters of the Brussels Convention understandably 
assumed that the New York Convention adequately addressed these problems, and 
so they created a categorical carve-out for arbitration cases in the courts. When, in 
TEU, supra n. 3, Title VI (Provisions on Cooperation in the Fields of Justice and Home Affairs), 1992 O.J. C 
191/1 (July 29, 1992). 
14 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1997 O.J. C 340/1 (Nov. 10, 1997), amending the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, art. 65. 
15 Council Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. L 12/1 (Jan. 16, 2001), art. 1(2). 
See supra n. 11, and accompanying text. 
Brussels Convention, supra n. 12, art. 1 (The Convention shall not apply to:. . . 4. arbitration'). A comparable 
provision is found in the Lugano Convention. 
18 See Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Societa Italiana ImpiantiPA, Case C-190/89, [1991] ECR1-3855 (para. 18) (holding 
that the Brussels Convention does not apply to proceedings before national courts for the appointment of an 
arbitrator). 
19 See supra n. 4. 
20 Id., art. II. 
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2000, the Convention was transformed into secondary EU legislation in the form 
of the Brussels I Regulation, the carve-out remained.22 
The Brussels I Regulation is currently the subject of proposed revisions. This is 
due largely to the ECJ's controversial 2009 judgment in Allianz SpA v. West Tankers 
Inc.23 In West Tankers, the Court ruled that while actions in national court to 
enforce arbitration agreements and arbitral awards fall within the Regulation's 
arbitration exception, that exception does not apply to a case merely because the 
jurisdiction of the rendering court is challenged on the basis of a prior arbitral 
agreement between the parties, provided the case is otherwise subject to the 
Regulation (as was the contract damages suit in West Tankers). Having brought this 
important category of cases within the scope of the Brussels Regulation, 
notwithstanding the Regulation's arbitration exception, the Court went on to 
subject it to the same prohibition on use by Member State courts of anti-suit 
injunctions targeting judicial proceedings in the courts of other Member States 
that the Court had previously imposed as a general matter in cases falling under 
the Regulation.24 
Viewed through the logic of the Brussels Regulation, the Court's position in 
West Tankers made good sense. An action for contract damages is no less subject to 
the Brussels Regulation's rules on the exercise of judicial jurisdiction in civil or 
commercial cases merely because jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an 
agreement to arbitrate rather than on some other ground. But, though logical from 
a Brussels Regulation perspective, and from an EU law perspective more generally, 
the result was pernicious from the viewpoint of international arbitration. Anti-suit 
injunctions in aid of agreements to arbitrate, like judicial orders compelling 
arbitration, had become a widely used and highly effective weapon against 
attempts by parties to avoid an agreement to arbitrate — attempts that had 
themselves become commonplace among parties resisting arbitration. It is small 
wonder that West Tankers elicited loud protests from the international arbitration 
community. 
On this particular conflict, the EU now appears poised to give ground. The 
European Commission has proposed introducing into the Brussels Regulation a 
mechanism whereby a Member State court would be required to stay any action 
arguably falling within the scope of an agreement that designates as arbitral situs 
another Member State, if and when the jurisdiction of either an arbitral tribunal 
Council Regulation 44/2001, supra n. 15, art. l(2)(d). 
Case C-185/07, [2009] ECR 1-663. In West Tankers, the Court was asked to decide whether a UK court's 
issuance of an anti-suit injunction in support of an arbitration agreement was consistent with the Brussels 
Regulation. The Court held that 'even though the proceedings do not come within the scope of Regulation 
No 44/2001, they may nevertheless have consequences which undermine its effectiveness.' The Court thus 
affirmed the breadth of the arbitration exception, even while relying on the policies underlying the 
Regulation to bar the use of the anti-suit injunction as an instrument for strengthening the enforcement of 
agreements to arbitrate. Id., para. 24. 
In Turner v. Grovit, Case C-159/02, [2004] ECR 1-3565, the ECJ had held that for a Member State court to 
seek to restrain the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of another Member State through anti-suit 
injunctions, even if the latter's assertion of jurisdiction was improper under the Brussels Regulation, would 
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or a court situated within that other State is invoked in relation to the dispute.25 
Though the proposal eschews the anti-suit injunction - an instrument upon which 
the continental legal culture generally frowns - it features a mechanism that 
achieves very much the same result. While maintaining the Regulation's 
arbitration exclusion, the proposal would require Member State courts to support 
arbitration by deferring to the arbitral tribunal or to a court of the arbitral situs as 
soon as the jurisdiction of either is invoked over the dispute. This represents a 
significant enlistment of EU law in support of arbitration.26 
(c) Authority to Make Preliminary References 
Further indicative of the traditional distance between EU law and the law of 
international arbitration is the apparendy setded position of the ECJ that arbitral 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), COM(2010) 748 final, 2010/0383 
(COD) (Dec. 14, 2010), art. 29(4). The mechanism represents a variation on lis pendens in that a court must 
refrain from entertaining a case once there has been instituted in the arbitral seat either an arbitration itself 
or court proceedings relating to it. A stay would become mandatory 'once the courts of the Member State 
where die seat of the arbitration is located or the arbitral tribunal has been seised of proceedings to 
determine, as their main object or as an incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of that 
arbitration agreement.' Moreover, should the arbitral tribunal or court of the arbitral seat determine that the 
arbitration agreement exists and is valid, the Member State court where the initial action is pending must 
decline jurisdiction. Id. According to the proposal, this modification 'will enhance the effectiveness of 
arbitration agreements in Europe, prevent parallel court and arbitration proceedings, and eliminate me 
incentive for abusive litigation tactics.' Id., p. 9, para. 3.1.4. 
In fact, me provision is even more favourable to arbitration than may at first appear. Traditional lis pendens 
operates chronologically; the court first seized keeps the case to the exclusion of those that come later. Article 
29(4) is drafted in such a way (notably through the word 'once') to require deference to the arbitration even 
if the arbitration is instituted after litigation has been begun. See Martin Illmer, 'Brussels I and Arbitration 
Revisited: The European Commission's Proposal COM(2010) 748 final' (Max Planck Private Law Research 
Paper No. 11/6)17-18(2011). 
The Commission proposal includes a second change that would further enhance the effectiveness of 
arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. Under the proposal, Member State courts would also be 
required to entertain applications for provisional relief in aid of arbitration. This would have the effect of 
placing the grant of provisional relief in aid of arbitration on the same footing as the grant of provisional 
relief in aid of litigation in the courts of other Member States. Indeed it would go further, since the obligation 
to support international arbitration through the grant of provisional measures as appropriate would obtain 
whether or not the arbitration is sited within the EU. 
In its earlier Green Paper, the Commission had proposed a full or partial deletion of the arbitration 
exclusion so as to bring all court proceedings in support of arbitration within the scope of the Regulation, 
possibly coupled with a grant of exclusive jurisdiction over such proceedings to the courts of the Member 
State of the place of arbitration. Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on 
jurisdiction and die recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM(2009) 
175 final (Apr. 21, 2009), pp. 8-9. This proposal was roundly rejected by the international arbitration 
community, which took the position that the arbitration exclusion had not been problematic in practice; that 
bringing arbitration within the scope of the Brussels Regulation would be inconsistent with the Member 
States' obligations under the New York Convention; and that the deletion of the arbitration exclusion would 
give rise to difficulties and uncertainties. See, e.g., IBA Submission to the European Commission on 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 (June 15, 2009); Comments to the European Commission of the Comite 
francais de Farbitrage (June 16,2009); Submission of the Association for International Arbitration in relation 
to the Green Paper released in connection with the review of Regulation 44/2001 (June 25, 2009). 
Consequendy, the European Commission abandoned its proposal to delete the arbitration exclusion in the 
Brussels Regulation, making the more moderate proposals discussed above in its December 2010 proposals 
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tribunals lack standing to make preliminary references to that Court. The 
preliminary reference mechanism, by which Member State courts may, and under 
some circumstances must, refer questions to the ECJ on the interpretation or 
validity of EU law, if necessary for disposing of particular cases before them, 
enables EU law to effectively penetrate the Member State legal orders.27 As part of 
the procedural landscape from the European Community's very beginnings,28 
preliminary references have given the ECJ vast opportunities to expound 
authoritatively on EU law, in the expectation that Member State courts, having 
suspended proceedings to make the very reference in question, will upon resuming 
the case follow the Court's ruling.29 Moreover, the Court's preliminary rulings -
though issued in the context of a particular referral — have carried as much 
precedential weight as any other judgment of the Court for future cases arising in 
Member State courts. 
The ECJ has consistently maintained the view that arbitral tribunals, though 
sitting on the territory of a Member State and even governed by that State's law of 
arbitration, do not constitute 'courts or tribunals of the Member States,' for 
purposes of the Treaty's preliminary reference mechanism.30 Accordingly, arbitral 
tribunals may not seek preliminary rulings from the Court on the meaning or 
validity of EU law, despite the fact that the dispute before them raises such issues, 
even centrally. This perfecdy reasonable reading of the treaty language means that 
an arbitral tribunal confronting an issue, and even an entire case, governed by EU 
law cannot seek the kind of guidance on the meaning or validity of the relevant EU 
law norms that would ordinarily be available to a national court hearing the 
identical dispute. 
Precluding arbitral tribunals from referring questions to the ECJ arguably 
lessens the effectiveness of EU law. An arbitral tribunal entertaining an EU 
competition law claim, for example, cannot make a preliminary reference to the 
TFEU, supra n. 3, art. 267. See generally Zekos, Antitrust-Competition, supra n. 6. 
For the current provision, see TFEU, supra n. 3, art. 267. 
George A. Bermann et al., Cases and Materials on European Union Law 324 (3d. ed. 2011). 
Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v. Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Mrdstern AG, Case 102/81, [1982] ECR 
1095. See also Denuit and Cordenier v. Transorient Mosaique Voyages and Culture, SA., Case C-125/04, [2005] ECR 
1-923 (para. 13). More recently, the Court ruled in the European Schools case that a complaint board set up by 
international agreement is not a 'court or tribunal' for preliminary reference purposes, primarily because it 
was an organ of an international organization having a distinct identity from the Member States. Miles and 
Others v. Ecoles europeennes, Case C-196/09, [2011]. 
The Court has clarified that, in order to qualify as a court or tribunal for these purposes, a body 'must be 
established by law, have permanent existence, exercise binding jurisdiction, be bound by rules of adversary 
procedure and apply the rules of law.' Municipality ofAlmelo v. NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij, Case C-393/92, [1994] 
ECR I- 1477 (para. 21). What distinguishes arbitral tribunals from courts is their status and not the legal 
principles they apply. Arbitral bodies are not courts or tribunals because parties are not bound to arbitrate 
and public authorities are not involved in arbitration. Nordsee, paras 11-13. Thus, a national court, hearing a 
challenge to an arbitral award, remains a court for preliminary reference purposes, even if the legal principles 
that it (like the tribunal) must apply in the case are the norms of fairness and reasonableness. Almelo, paras 
21-24. 
In the same vein, the French Cour de Cassation has held that an arbitral tribunal is not an emanation of 
the State and does not constitute a French court or tribunal within the meaning of the requirement of a fair 
hearing under Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights. Decision of February 20, 2001, 
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Court, no matter how compelling its need for clarification of EU law on that 
subject. On the other hand, the cost in EU law efficacy should not be exaggerated. 
Even without the benefit of preliminary rulings from the Court, arbitral tribunals 
seldom find themselves in the dark with respect to EU law. Advocates can be 
counted on to educate arbitral tribunals reasonably well about the contours of EU 
law, as needed. Moreover, as the Court specifically observed in the leading case,31 
arbitration agreements and arbitral measures and awards commonly end up in 
litigation before Member State courts at one stage or another in the arbitral 
life-cycle. Those courts, being 'courts or tribunals of member states,' may then of 
course make any preliminary references to the Court that are otherwise 
appropriate. Such proceedings - national court actions relating to arbitration -
may have fallen into a carve-out from the Brussels Convention and Regulation,32 
but they were not excluded from the EU's preliminary reference mechanism. 
The European treaties, which have been fundamentally revised on several 
occasions over the years, could readily have been amended to enable arbitral 
tribunals to make preliminary references to the Court. That step, however, has 
never been taken. Whether driven by an assumption that EU law issues will seldom 
arise in arbitration, by a desire not to overburden the Court, by a textual 
interpretation of the treaty language 'courts or tribunals of member states,' or by 
some other purpose, the exclusion of arbitral tribunals from the preliminary 
reference mechanism has endured. Even as the Commission has been vigorously 
urging private parties to bring claims in Member State courts for damages against 
enterprises for their violations of EU competition law,33 knowing that at least some 
of those claims were found to fall within the ambit of a broadly drafted arbitration 
clause, the EU has left arbitral tribunals without authority to seek direct guidance 
from the Court. 
The EU has in this way contributed to the distance separating EU law and 
international arbitration practice. But neither the arbitration exclusion from the 
Brussels Convention and Regulation nor arbitrators' lack of standing to make 
preliminary references to the Court of Justice has in any way slowed the 
development of international arbitration in Europe or kept it from entering into 
what has been called its 'golden age.'34 While at times awkward and even 
unnatural, the peaceful coexistence of EU law and arbitration has largely 
prevailed. 
31 Nordsee, supra n. 30, paras 14-15. 
32 See supra, notes 16-22, and accompanying text. 
33 Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 165 (Apr. 
2, 2008). For an argument that the ECJ should treat investment arbitration tribunals, as distinct from 
commercial arbitration tribunals, as 'courts or tribunals of a Member State,' see Stephan Schill, Arbitration 
Procedure: the Role of the European Union and the Member States in Investor-State Arbitration', in 
Catherine Kessedjian (ed.), 'Le droit europeen et l'arbitrage d'investissement: European Law and Investment 
Arbitration'129, 144(2011). 
34 Amr Shalakany, Book Review, 'International Arbitration in the 21 st Century: Towards 'Judicialisation' and 
Uniformity?' (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brewer, eds.), 9 Eur. J. Int'lL. 576 (1998); 'Arbitration: the End 
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The landscape I have sketched is, however, changing in potentially important 
ways. One source of change, and of the emergence of a dangerous intersection 
between EU law and the law of international arbitration, is the evolution of the 
notion of public policy in EU law. For this development, sketched in Part II below, 
the ECJ itself is largely responsible. A second source of change is the growth of a 
robust international investor protection regime that places substantial constraints 
on States' freedom to act in ways detrimental to the interests of foreign investors, 
coupled with a potent investment arbitration mechanism for resolution of the 
disputes that result. When actions by Member States generating investor 
protection claims stem from EU law mandates, tensions between the EU and the 
international investment regimes necessarily follow. Those tensions are the subject 
of Part III below. 
II. T H E T W O W O R L D S O F PUBLIC P O L I C Y 
The notion of public policy surfaces across broad swaths of the law in virtually all 
legal systems. But regardless of the area of law or the particular legal system in 
which it operates, public policy performs the same basic functions. It limits the 
enforceability of otherwise permissible exercises of party autonomy, within the law 
of contract, succession, or any other private law field. More important, for present 
purposes, is its limitation on the enforceability of otherwise applicable choice of 
forum clauses, choice of law clauses, rules of foreign law, or foreign judgments. 
Public policy limitations of the latter sort are predicated on a court's interest in 
safeguarding the most fundamental values of the legal system of which it is a part. 
Even under the Brussels I Regulation as it stands, an EU Member State court may 
withhold recognition or enforcement from a judgment of another Member State's 
courts on public policy grounds, although the Court of Justice has done its level 
best to keep national courts from applying the public policy defence too broadly.35 
Public policy is a notoriously vague concept, whatever the context in which it 
arises.36 Courts37 and scholars38 alike regularly lament its pervasive indeterminacy. 
Council Regulation 44/2001, supra n. 15, art. 34(1). 
'[T]he concrete components of public policy as a ground of the control over arbitral awards.. . are hardly 
identifiable beyond what is commonly referred to as the most fundamental principles of justice and 
morality. . . . [A] s a German court put it, a violation of essential principles of German law (ordre public) 
exists only if the arbitral award contravenes a rule which is basic to public or commercial life, or if it 
contradicts the German idea of justice in a fundamental way.' Shelkopklyas, supra n. 1, at 364. 
According to Swiss Federal Tribunal,' [t] he substantive appraisal of a claim in dispute only violates public 
policy when it contravenes fundamental principles of law and is therefore incompatible per se with the system 
of law and values.'Judgment of Nov. 14,1991, XVII Tbk Comm. Arb. 279, 284 (1992). See also Decision of the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal of 7 March 2003 (RP.250/2002), section 2.1 (an award can be set aside only if its 
outcome is contrary to public policy; it is insufficient mat the reasoning conflicts with public policy). 
More recendy, the Swiss Federal Tribunal rendered a decision that evidently for the first time under the 
current Swiss Private International Law (PILA) annulled an arbitral award due to a violation of substantive 
public policy. Decision of March 27, 2012, no. 4A_558/2011 March 2012 , finding that '[tjhe substantive 
adjudication of a dispute violates public policy only when it disregards some fundamental legal principles and 
consequently becomes completely inconsistent with the important, generally recognised values, which 
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By any account, courts have substantial latitude in determining whether a given 
norm rises to the level of public policy within their respective legal orders, and 
whether that norm is sufficiendy offended to bring a public policy injunction into 
play.39 Determining the scope of public policy within any given legal order is 
ultimately the prerogative of that legal order's highest courts - a prerogative that 
public policy's nebulous character only strengthens. Precisely for that reason, and 
regardless of the area of law in which it is invoked, public policy ordinarily receives 
a narrow interpretation. Across jurisdictions, relatively few legal norms rise to the 
level of public policy, and denomination of a norm as public policy remains 
exceptional. That is decidedly the case in the specific context of international 
arbitration, a matter to which I now turn. 
(a) The Public Policy Defence in International Arbitration 
Public policy plays a highly distinctive role in the international arbitration world. 
It is one of the few grounds on which courts of the arbitral situs may annul an 
otherwise proper arbitral award or on which courts elsewhere in the world may 
deny the award recognition or enforcement. The possibility that an arbitral award 
may be denied effect by national courts on public policy grounds is inscribed in the 
New York Convention,40 in the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration,41 and in the positive law of just about every jurisdiction 
in the world that seriously seeks to attract international arbitration, whether it has 
codified its arbitration law or not.42 Indeed, under the Convention43 and the 
Model Law44 alike, courts appear to have authority to raise a public policy 
objection sua sponte. 
See Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252 (1824) (Borrough,J.) ('[Public policy] is a very unruly horse, and 
when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you.') See also Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding 
Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931) ('The meaning of the phrase "public policy" is vague and variable; courts 
have not defined it, and there is no fixed rule by which to determine what contracts are repugnant to it'). 
See Friedrich K. Juenger, 'General Course on Private International Law', 193 RCADI 1985-IV, p. 201 
(describing public policy as 'spelling] uncertainty, unpredictability, and lack of uniformity'). For a 
comprehensive overview of the different types of public policy that courts apply in international arbitration 
cases, see James D. Fry, 'Desordre Public International under the New York Convention: Whither Truly 
International Public Policy', 8 Chin. J. Int'lL. 81 (2009). 
On the meaning of public policy in the EU law context, see generally Sacha Prechal, 'Community Law in 
National Courts: The Lessons from Van Schijndel', 35 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 681, 702-05 (1998); Georges 
Karydis, 'Ordre public dans l'ordre juridique communautaire', 38 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europeen 1 (2002); 
Christoph Liebscher, 'European Public Policy—A Black Box?', 17 J. Int'lArb. 73 (2000). 
New York Convention, supra n. 4, art. V(2)(b). 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, art. 34(2)(b)(ii). See generally Jean-Baptiste Racine, 'La contribution de l'ordre 
public europeen a l'elaboration d'un ordre public transnational en droit de l'arbitrage', RA.E. - LEA. 
2005/2, p. 227, citing corruption as a public policy basis for challenging an award. 
Gary B. Born, '2 International Commercial Arbitration' 2620-2621 (Kluwer 2009). 
New York Convention, supra n. 4, art. V(2)(b). ('Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also 
be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds 
that . . . (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that 
country'). 
UNCITRAL Model Law of International Commercial Arbitration, supra n. 41, art. 34(2)(b)(ii) ('An arbitral 









orial Library user on 06 February 2020
Navigating EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration 409 
Despite its near-universality as a ground for challenging international arbitral 
awards, public policy is subject to a decidedly narrow interpretation. In this 
respect, it operates no differently in the arbitration context than elsewhere in 
private international law. But the narrowness of public policy in international 
arbitration is particularly emphatic, fueled by a concern that national courts can 
all too readily invoke public policy as a ground for rejecting international arbitral 
awards of which they disapprove on the merits - a move that would drastically 
undermine international arbitration's effectiveness and viability as an alternative 
to national courts as a forum for the resolution of international disputes. Nothing 
short of the finality of arbitral awards is assumed to be at stake.45 
In the interest of finality, courts hearing actions for post-award relief are 
regularly enjoined to refrain from correcting errors of fact or of law,46 and to 
construe narrowly the few grounds that are available for annulling awards or 
denying them recognition or enforcement, public policy included.47 Courts seem 
never to tire, even in the rare instance in which they do sustain a public policy 
challenge to an award, but also in the far more numerous instances when they do 
not, of reminding challengers of the narrowness of public policy in the arbitration 
setting.48 In order for an award to merit either annulment by a court of the place 
of arbitration or denial of recognition or enforcement by a court elsewhere on 
public policy grounds,49 it must offend a norm that is well-defined, deeply held, 
and rooted in the most fundamental notions of morality and justice.50 
In some legal systems, though not the United States, the narrowness of the 
public policy defence in the arbitration context is strengthened by the further 
proposition that the public policy that is relevant in this context is international, as 
opposed to national, public policy. Under this view, it is not enough to justify 
policy of this State' (emphasis added). Most of the grounds for denying recognition or enforcement of an 
award under the Model Law are preceded by the language 'An arbitral award may be set aside . . . only if (a) 
the party making the application furnishes proof that . . . ' Id., art. 34(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
Restatement of the Law Third of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, sec. 4-11 (Tentative 
Draft No. 2, Apr. 16, 2012) (approved May 22, 2012); Born, supra n. 42, at 2560-2567, 2711-2729. 
Id., sec. 4-11, comment c; Born, supra n. 42, at 2599. 
Restatement, supra n. 45, sec. 4-18, comment b; Born, supra n. 42, at 2625-2628. 
A J. van den Berg, 'The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation' 265, 360 (1981). 
Public policy performs another function in the international arbitration context, but that function is 
unrelated to the present inquiry. I refer to the use by arbitral tribunals themselves of 'public policy' as an 
instrument for rejecting application of otherwise applicable substantive rules of law where giving effect to 
them would offend the most fundamental values and principles. See Shelkoplyas, supra n. 1, at 179. 
'[According to the prevailing view,.. . public policy is a safety mechanism protecting the forum's legal and 
ethical principles which constitute its most fundamental pillars.' Id., at 197. For this purpose as well, the 
notion of public policy is strictly and narrowly interpreted. See Regit national* des usines Renault SA v. Maxicar 
SpA and Orazio Formmto, Case C-38/98, [2000] ECR1-2973, para. 26 (stating that the public policy provision 
in Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted strictly). 
Even within Europe, national judiciaries disagree over the proper outlook of courts in wielding a public 
policy defence and, more particularly, over whether to adopt a primarily national or a primarily international 
attitude in giving content to public policy. See Fry, supra n. 38, at 94-100 (reviewing the interpretations of 
public policy in national arbitration laws around the world and categorising them as public policy of the 
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non-recognition or non-enforcement on public policy grounds that an award 
offends a fundamental principle of the legal system whose court is asked to give it 
effect; rather, the award must offend fundamental values that are viewed as more 
or less universal. 
(b) European Union Public Policy 
Within many areas of EU law, public policy enjoys a similarly narrow 
understanding. The setting in which public policy most commonly arises is that in 
which an EU Member State seeks to justify an apparent violation of an EU law 
norm — notably a cardinal principle such as the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital — by invoking a consideration of national public policy. The 
ECJ generally subjects any such claim on the part of a Member State to the 
strictest of scrutiny, lest the effectiveness of EU law be impaired by anything short 
of the most compelling of policy considerations.51 To this extent, public policy in 
EU law is subject to much the same restrictive interpretation as it has received in 
the international arbitration context and in private international law more 
generally. 
However, the ECJ is proving far less restrictive when it comes to imbuing EU 
law norms themselves with a public policy dimension. The emergence of EU 
public policy as a construct is in fact a relatively recent development.52 For most of 
its history, the European Union did not distinguish between EU law, on the one 
hand, and EU public policy, on the other. Nor did the treaties establishing the 
European Community, and thereafter the European Union, offer textual support 
for such a notion. Nevertheless, the ECJ has come to embrace the idea that certain 
legal norms are so essential to attainment of the EU's most fundamental objectives 
that they must be treated as if mandatory, in the sense that private parties may not 
waive them, that choice of law clauses may not oust them, and that national courts 
are required to invoke and apply them regardless of the otherwise applicable law, 
even raising them sua sponte if need be.53 To term a norm of EU law origin as 
having the status of public policy is to say that it cannot be compromised in any of 
these or similar ways. 
The emergence of a notion of public policy within EU law is not in itself 
particularly remarkable. The EU is a polity based on the rule of law. Like most any 
other entity of that description, it asserts the right to ascribe to certain of its norms 
such fundamental importance as to warrant protection against both exercises of 
See, for example, Rave-Central v. Bundesmonopolverwaltungfir Branntwein, Case 120/78, [1979] ECR 649. 
On European public policy generally, see Peter F. Schlosser, 'Arbitration and the European Public Policy', in 
Arbitration and European Law, reports of the International Colloquium qfCEPANI, April 25, 1997 81-96; M. Fallon, 
'Les conflits de lois et de juridictions dans un espace economique integre. L'experience de la Communaute 
europeenne', 255 R.CA.D.I. 9, 140-149 (1995-III); Liebscher, supra n. 39; Yves Brulard & Yves Quintin, 
'European Community Law and Arbitration—National Versus Community Public Policy', 18 J. Int'lArb. 533 
(2001). See also Shelkyoplas, supra n. 1, § 4.2. 
See, e.g., Ingmar GB Ltd v. Eaton Leonard Technologies Inc., Case C-381 /98, [2000] ECR I -9305. See generally, 
Stephanie Drancq, 'The Scope of Secondary Community Law in the Light of the Methods of Private 









orial Library user on 06 February 2020
Navigating EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration 411 
party autonomy and the operation of ordinary conflict of law rules. But, within the 
EU, and especially for the ECJ, the notion of EU public policy stands to serve an 
additional and distinctive function, namely ensuring the primacy of EU law vis-a-
vis the law of the Member States. The Court's early case law had already posited 
that much of EU law enjoys 'direct applicability,' in the sense of not requiring 
transposition at the national level in order to become part of the Member States' 
domestic legal orders.54 The Court also ascribed to much of EU law the quality of 
having 'direct effect,' that is, giving rise to private rights that individuals may assert 
in national administrative and judicial proceedings and that all Member State 
authorities, including Member State courts, must protect.55 In the Court's view, 
EU law also enjoys primacy over any national law norm - even a national norm of 
constitutional status - with which it comes into conflict.56 With the passage of time, 
the Court further strengthened EU law's demands on Member States by requiring 
them to make available all procedures and forms of relief, whether administrative 
or judicial, necessary to ensure that rights derived from EU law are supported by 
adequate remedies at the Member State level — with the Court ultimately reserving 
to itself the right to decide whether a given State's machinery of administrative or 
judicial justice meets the adequacy standard.57 Denominating a particular EU law 
norm as 'EU public policy' cannot help but enhance its status still further. 
[ij The Public Policy Imperative in EU Law: The Eco Swiss Case 
As much as any ECJ judgment, the judgment in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton 
International XV58 lent currency to the notion of EU public policy. The case is cited 
most often for the proposition that the norms underlying EU competition law 
enjoy public policy status. But Eco Swiss arose in both a competition law and an 
arbitration context, and public policy performs very different functions in those 
two settings. 
Eco Swiss and Bulova Watch had entered into a licensing agreement with 
Benetton that permitted Eco Swiss and Bulova to manufacture and sell watches 
and clocks bearing the words 'Benetton by Bulova.' Under the agreement, Eco 
Swiss could not sell those products in Italy and Bulova could not sell them 
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrate der Belastingen, Case 26/62. [1963] ECR 1. 
Id.; Costa v. Ente Nazumak per I'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585. 
Amministrazione delk Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, Case 106/77, [1978] ECR 629. 
Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, [1984] ECR 1891. 
Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton InternationalNV, Case 126/97, [1999] ECR 1-3055. The Court's position 
in Eco Swiss was not entirely novel. Several years earlier, the Court said: 
That interpretation by the Court is not affected by the fact that, by virtue of the arbitration agreement 
made between the parties, a court such as the Gerechtshof gives judgment according to what appears fair and 
reasonable. It follows from the principles of the primacy of Community law and of its uniform application, 
in conjunction with Article 5 of the Treaty, that a court of a Member State to which an appeal against an 
arbitration award is made pursuant to national law must, even where it gives judgment having regard to 
fairness, observe the rules of Community law, in particular those relating to competition. 
Almeb v. Energiebedrijf Ijssebnij NV, Case C-393/92, E.C.R. 1-1477 (1994), para. 23. 
On the Eco Swiss judgment generally, see Fallon, supra n. 52, at 140-149 (1995-III); Christoph Liebscher, 
'Arbitral & Judicial Decision: European Public Policy After Eco Swiss', 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 81 (1999); 
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anywhere in the EU but Italy. When Benetton terminated the agreement, Eco 
Swiss and Bulova initiated arbitration in the Netherlands pursuant to the 
agreement's arbitration clause, and won an award for breach of contract. Benetton 
then sought to have the award annulled in Dutch court under Dutch arbitration 
law. 
Benetton encountered two problems, however. First, it had failed to launch 
annulment proceedings within the three-month limitations period prescribed by 
Dutch law. Second, its principal argument in support of the award's annulment -
namely that the contract upon which the claim was based was itself illegal under 
EU competition law, and thus unenforceable — was one that Benetton had failed to 
raise during the arbitration, and therefore had arguably waived or forfeited. 
The Dutch annulment proceeding prompted a preliminary reference to the 
ECJ. The Dutch court wanted to know whether it was required to annul awards for 
violation of EU public policy and, if so, whether the violation of EU competition 
law alleged by Benetton amounted to a public policy violation for these purposes. 
It also wanted to know whether EU law required it to entertain the annulment 
action, despite passage of the Dutch limitations period and despite Benetton's 
failure to advance its competition law argument in the arbitration. 
The Dutch court should not have been surprised, upon receiving the 
preliminary ruling, to learn that the ECJ requires any Member State that treats 
offence to domestic public policy as a ground for annulling a local award (as they all in 
fact do) to treat offence to EU public policy as a ground for annulment as well. To 
reach that result, the Court had only to invoke the so-called 'principle of 
equivalence' that it had long since announced and applied in many other settings. 
Under that principle, Member States are barred from discriminating procedurally 
against legal claims derived from EU law as compared to analogous claims based 
on domestic law.59 Thus, while Member States enjoy basic 'procedural autonomy,' 
that is, the right to determine the ways in which their authorities - notably then-
courts - implement and enforce the law, including EU law,60 they must not 
discriminate against EU-law-based claims by comparison with analogous domestic 
law claims. In other words, Member States must accord EU-law-based claims what 
Rewe-^mtralfinanz EG v. Landurirtschaftskammer jur Das Saarland, Case 33/76, [1976] ECR 1989, para. 5; van 
Schijndel and van Veen v. Stichlvng Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431 /93, [1995] 
ECR 1-4705, paras 13, 17. 
For an interesting application of the principle, see Kiikne & HeitzNVv. Produktschap voor Pluimvee en Eieren, 
Case C-453/00, [2004] ECR 1-837. The referring Dutch court asked the ECJ whether a Member State 
authority is required, upon request, to reopen a matter on which it had made a final decision, where the 
decision was based on an interpretation of EU law that the Court of Justice had later rejected. The Court 
observed that under Dutch law, subsequent case law may in certain circumstances be given effect in cases in 
which a final decision was made and all ordinary remedies exhausted. The Court ruled, implicitly, on the 
basis of the equivalency principle, that under broadly similar circumstances Dutch bodies must review 
otherwise final decisions in order to take account of subsequent interpretations of the relevant provision of 
EU law by ECJ. Id., paras 27-28. 
See Theofrastous, supra n. 1, at 485 ('As with national laws, the primary questions here are whether there are 
E.U. objectives to be honored in terms of Public Policy and Arbitrability, and whether those objectives will 
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might simply be called 'national treatment.' Accordingly, if Dutch courts subject 
arbitral awards to annulment for violation of Dutch public policy, they must be 
equally prepared to do so for violation of EU public policy. On the premise that it 
and it alone determines the scope and content of EU public policy,61 the Court 
then went on in Eco Swiss to rule that EU competition policy does indeed constitute 
EU public policy.62 
Over the years, the Court of Justice had applied the principle of equivalence to 
a myriad of more or less narrow procedural rules of the Member States, including 
rules on standing to sue, remedy limitations, and the obligation of courts to raise 
legal issues sua sponte. In fact, the Court also applied the principle of equivalence in 
Eco Swiss to an issue of just that sort, namely the statute of limitations, satisfying 
itself that the Dutch three-month statute of limitations would be applied 
evenhandedly to annulment actions alleging violation of both Dutch and EU 
public policy. Unfortunately, Benetton, as noted, had let the limitations period 
elapse before bringing its annulment action, and it was unable to avoid the time 
bar by invoking the other main limitation that the ECJ has placed on the 
procedural autonomy of the Member States, namely the 'principle of effectiveness.' 
(Stated in very general terms, the 'principle of effectiveness' requires Member 
States, in addition to giving EU law claims national treatment, to make available to 
persons invoking an EU law right in national court such procedures and remedies 
as are necessary to adequately ensure their enjoyment of the benefits to which the 
right in question entitles them.63) Applying the effectiveness principle to the statute 
of limitations, the Court ruled that three months was a reasonable time limit on 
bringing actions to annul arbitral awards; it was not so short as to render such 
actions unduly difficult to bring, even in a case like Eco Swiss in which a party was 
seeking annulment on public policy grounds. Thus, even though competition law 
constituted EU public policy, for purposes of the annulment of arbitral awards, 
Benetton forfeited the right to prove that the award rendered against it in disregard 
of EU competition law should be annulled on public policy grounds.64 
It was on that very assumption that the Dutch court in Eco Swiss referred to the Court the question whether 
the competition law claim asserted in the Dutch annulment proceeding was of an EU public policy nature. 
For reaffirmation of competition law's 'public policy' status, see Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA, 
Joined Cases C-295-98/04, [2006] ECR 1-6619, para. 31; T-Mobile Netherlands BVv. Road van bestuur van de 
Nederlandse Mededmgingsautoriteit, Case C-8/08, [2009] ECR 1-4529 (para. 49). 
To the extent that Eco Swiss designated EU competition law as having public policy status, it echoed the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
Impliedly, the Eco Swiss judgment treated EU competition law claims as arbitrable, much as the U.S. 
Supreme Court declared antitrust law claims arbitrable in Mitsubishi. 
Eco Swiss, supra n. 58, para. 45. See also Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, Case 45/76, [1976] ECR 
2043, paras 12-16. On the Court's jurisprudence developing the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, 
see generally Prechal, supra n. 39. 
However, the Court in Eco Swiss nevertheless hinted that it would not be quick to treat the competition law 
claim as waived, where the forum in which the waiver allegedly occurred was one not authorised to make 
preliminary references to the Court of Justice on the meaning of EU law: 
[Arbitrators, unlike national courts and tribunals, are not in a position to request this Court to give a 
preliminary ruling on questions of interpretation of Community law. However, it is manifestly in the interest 
of the Community legal order that, in order to forestall differences of interpretation, every Community 
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Returning to the equivalency principle, it is true that the ECJ has occasionally 
applied it to non-procedural questions. In one case, a Greek court asked the Court 
whether it could freely apply the traditional Greek 'abuse of rights' doctrine, 
rooted in the Greek Civil Code, to bar a party from abusively invoking a right 
under EU law.65 However, public policy is an especially amorphous and sweeping 
notion with potentially far-reaching substantive implications.66 Its reach in the 
arbitration context is no less than its reach elsewhere in private international law, 
where it can operate to bar die enforcement of otherwise applicable laws, 
judgments, or contracts, across the board. 
Applying the equivalency principle to public policy in the international 
arbitration context in particular entails especially high stakes. First, annulment of 
an arbitral award on grounds of public policy (or indeed on any ground) renders 
the award a legal nullity within the jurisdiction rendering that judgment. 
Annulment also greatly reduces, without altogether eliminating, the award's 
prospects of winning recognition or enforcement elsewhere; an award's annulment 
by a competent court is sufficient under the New York Convention to justify the 
courts of other States in denying the award recognition or enforcement.67 Even if 
an award is not challenged in a court of the arbitral situs (or is challenged, but 
survives), its recognition or enforcement by a foreign court can still be defeated if 
that court finds that the award's recognition or enforcement would offend that 
jurisdiction's own public policy.68 An award annulled by a competent court or 
denied recognition or enforcement by foreign courts accordingly has rather litde 
value. 
Second, treating violation of EU public policy in particular as a basis for 
annulling an arbitral award effectively makes the public policy defence mandatory 
rather than discretionary. It is widely assumed that, despite their importance, none 
of the grounds for annulment of awards or for denial of their recognition or 
enforcement — not even violation of public policy — is stricdy-speaking mandatory, 
in the sense that a national court is obligated to annul the award or deny it 
recognition or enforcement once the ground is established. The operative term in 
the New York Convention and the Model Law is the permissive 'may.' Improbable 
though it is, courts theoretically may in their discretion decline to annul an award 
(or proceed to recognise or enforce it), even though they find the award or its 
applied. It follows that, in the circumstances of the present case . . . Community law requires that questions 
concerning the interpretation of the prohibition laid down in [EU competition law] should be open to 
examination by national courts when asked to determine die validity of an arbitral award and that it should 
be possible for those questions to be referred, if necessary, to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. 
Eco Sums, supra n. 58, para. 40. 
Panaris PafiUs v. Trapeza Kentrikis Ellados AE, Case C-441/93, [1996] ECR 1-1347. The Court held, 
unsurprisingly, that die Greek rule 'must not detract from the full effect and uniform application of 
Community law in the Member States.' Id., paras 68-70. 
Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "'Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws', 56 Colum. L. Res. 969 
(1956). 
New York Convention, supra n. 4, art. V(l)(e). 
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enforcement repugnant to public policy.69 But, under the Court of Justice's 
hierarchy of norms, the courts of the Member States almost certainly have no 
discretion to uphold an award if in fact doing so would offend EU public policy. 
[iij Beyond Eco Swiss 
Eco Swiss was the first ruling in which the ECJ employed the principle of 
equivalence in connection with the annulment of an arbitral award, or indeed in 
connection with arbitration altogether. The Court returned to the notion of EU 
public policy in arbitration in the case of Mostaza Claw v. Centro MovilMilenium.1® A 
Spanish telecom company had instituted arbitration against one of its customers, 
Mostaza Claro, for failure to comply with the minimum contractual period of her 
telephone service subscription. Although the subscription agreement contained an 
arbitration clause, it also gave customers the right to have a covered dispute heard 
in a judicial rather than an arbitral forum. Mostaza Claro did not, however, invoke 
that right. Instead, she appeared in the arbitration and interposed a defence on the 
merits, without raising any jurisdictional objection. Having lost in the arbitration, 
she then sought annulment of the award in a Spanish court, arguing that the 
underlying arbitration agreement was invalid under EU law as an 'unfair contract 
term,' within the meaning of the EU directive on unfair clauses in consumer 
contracts.71 The national court referred to the ECJ the question whether a 
Member State court that is hearing an action to annul an arbitral award is 
required to determine whether the underlying agreement to arbitrate is unfair and 
therefore unenforceable under the unfair consumer contract terms directive, even 
if the consumer failed to raise that issue before the arbitrators. The national court 
was essentially inviting the ECJ to revisit one of the questions that the Dutch court 
had raised in Eco Swiss but that the Court of Justice had not squarely answered.72 
In Mostaza Claro, the Court of Justice ruled that the consumer's failure to invoke 
the directive during the arbitral proceedings did not relieve the national court of 
the obligation to entertain that challenge once raised in an annulment action.73 It 
described the rights conferred by the directive as being, to that extent, non-
waivable.74 Relying on the principle of effectiveness,75 the Court in Mostaza Claro 
held that a consumer's failure to question the fairness of a consumer contract term 
Restatement, supra n. 45, sec. 4-11(d). 
Elisa Maria Mostaza Claro v. Centro Movil Milenium SL, Case C-168/05, [2006] ECR 1-10421. 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 OJ. L 95 (Apr. 21, 1993). 
Since the annulment action in Eco Swiss was time-barred under Dutch law, and since application of the Dutch 
limitations period was found to offend neither the principle of equivalence nor the principle of effectiveness, 
the annulment action could not in any event proceed. 
Mostaza Claro, supra n. 70, paras 30-31. 
On consumer arbitration generally in the US and EU, see Christopher R. Drahozal & Raymond J. Friel, 
'Consumer Arbitration in the European Union and the United States', 28 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Meg. 357 
(2002); Donna M. Bates, 'Note: A Consumer's Dream or Pandora's Box: Is Arbitration a Viable Option for 
Cross-Border Consumer Disputes?', 27 Fordham Int'l L. J. 823 (2004); Maud Piers, 'Consumer Arbitration in 
the EU: A Forced Marriage with Incompatible Expectations', 2(1) J. Int'lDisp. Settlement 209 (201 l);Jean R. 
Sternlight, 'Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory Consumer and 









orial Library user on 06 February 2020
416 Arbitration International, Volume 28 Issue 3 
during an arbitration does not excuse an annulment court from entertaining the 
challenge. We can infer from the case that a court (a) may address the fairness of a 
consumer contract term, even if the consumer never raised the issue, and (b) must 
address the term's fairness if the consumer raised the issue, even if only belatedly. 
Strictly speaking, the case did not require the Court to decide whether national 
courts must address the fairness of a consumer contract term even if the consumer 
never raises it.76 
The Court in Mostaza Claw relied secondarily on the principle of equivalence, 
holding, as it had done in Eco Swiss, that the national court was obligated to 
effectuate EU public policy norms as fully as it effectuates domestic public policy 
norms. 
Where its domestic rules of procedure require a national court to grant an application for 
annulment of an arbitration award, and where such an application is founded on failure to 
observe national rules of public policy, it must also grant such an application where it is founded 
on failure to comply with Community rules of this type . " 
A fair reading of the case thus suggests that if any right under national law is 
deemed so fundamental as to be unwaivable, then a right that is equally 
fundamental under EU law must, as a matter of EU public policy, likewise be 
treated as unwaivable. 
Just as in Eco Swiss, the Court in Mostaza Claw did not suggest that all EU law 
norms constitute public policy for purposes of the annulment of arbitral awards. 
75 The Court in Mostaza Claro built upon its prior decision in Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v Rocio Murciano Quintero, 
Joined Cases C-240-44/98, [2000] ECR 1-4941, a case not involving arbitration. Oceano Grupo arose out of a 
sale of encyclopedias on deferred payment terms. The contract of sale provided that in case of a dispute, the 
courts of Barcelona - which was the seller's place of business but not the purchaser's domicile - would have 
exclusive jurisdiction. In die seller's action for the purchase price, the buyer did not challenge the jurisdiction 
of the Barcelona court or the forum selection clause on which its jurisdiction was based. However, it occurred 
to the court that die forum selection clause might well be unfair within the meaning of the unfair consumer 
contract terms directive (and that, absent a valid forum selection clause designating that court as forum, it 
would have no basis on which to exercise jurisdiction). The Barcelona court thus referred to the Court of 
Justice the question whether the directive authorised national courts to determine, entirely on their own 
motion, whether such a consumer contract term is unfair within the meaning of die directive. 
The Court of Justice in Oceano Grupo answered in the affirmative, invoking the principle of effectiveness. 
It described Article 6(1) of die directive, which prohibited Member State courts from treating an unfair term 
as binding on the consumer, as 'a mandatory provision' and as 'essential to the accomplishment of the tasks 
entrusted to the consumer and, in particular, to raising the standard of living and the quality of life in the 
territory.' On several occasions thereafter, the Court reaffirmed Oceano Grupo, and its use of the effectiveness 
principle in connection with the unfair consumer contract terms directive (see, e.g., Cofidis SA v. Jean-Louis 
Fredout, Case C-473/00, [2002] ECR 1-10875; Pannon GSM &• v. Erzsebet Sustikne Gybrfi, Case C-243/08, 
[2009] ECR 1-4713), as well as with other consumer protection instruments (Max Rampion and Marie-Jeanne 
Rampion (nee Godard) v. Franfinance SA andKparKSAS, Case C-429/05, [2007] ECR 1-8017). 
Analogizing the importance of the unfair terms directive to the importance it had ascribed to competition 
law in Eco Swiss, the Court in Mostaza Claro concluded that Article 6(l)'s effectiveness would be undermined 
if national courts required the consumer himself or herself to challenge the fairness of a consumer contract 
term. 
The Court did not expressly find that Spanish law required a court to address a public policy ground under 
national law in an annulment action even though the consumer failed to raise the issue during the arbitral 
proceedings. 
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But neither did it go very far in indicating what features of the unfair consumer 
contract terms directive lent it public policy status. The ECJ characterised Article 
6(1) of the directive as 'mandatory,' even though Article 6(1) did not by its own 
terms so state. It simply inferred the directive's mandatory status from 'the nature 
and importance of the public interest underlying the protection which the 
Directive confers on consumers.'78 In drawing that inference, the Court confined 
itself to observing that the directive advanced an interest — namely, raising the 
standard of living and quality of life - that figures among those listed in Article 3 
of the then European Community Treaty as objectives of the Community. Yet the 
same could be said of virtually any EU law measure. Indeed, the EU law principles 
of proportionality and subsidiarity suggest that there is no warrant for an EU 
legislative norm unless it is an important one from the point of view of achieving 
the EU's objectives, as well as one that the Member States are incapable of 
effectively addressing themselves at the national level.79 
The more recent case of Asturcom Tekcomunicaciones SL v. Rodriguez Nogueira80 
introduces an important qualification to the Court's position in Mostaza Claw. The 
facts of Asturcom were similar to those in Mostaza Claro, except that (a) the consumer 
had not participated at all in the arbitral proceedings, (b) the tribunal issued its 
award by default, and (c) the consumer took no steps whatsoever to have the award 
annulled. The consumer had ignored the award altogether, prompting the 
claimant telecom company to seek enforcement of the award in a Spanish court.81 
That was the context in which the national court made a preliminary reference to 
the ECJ, asking whether it was obligated under these circumstances to invoke the 
directive on the consumer's behalf. 
Again, the ECJ analysed the case in terms of both the principle of effectiveness 
and the principle of equivalence. As to the former, the Court found that Spanish 
law gave the consumer an opportunity to seek the award's annulment that was 
adequate in all respects. It concluded in effect that to require the Spanish court to 
go further - namely to raise and entertain the consumer protection argument sua 
sponte, when the award was not only final, but the period for challenging it had 
passed without any action by the consumer - would impermissibly impair the 
fundamental principle of res judicata, while making EU law only marginally more 
effective. That, the ECJ concluded, would impose an unjustifiably high price on 
the Member State.82 It thus recognised that the principle of effectiveness has limits 
Id., para. 38. 
George A. Bermann, 'Taking Subsidiarity Seriously', 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331 (1994). 
Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL. v. Cristina Rodriguez Nogueira, Case C-40/08, [2009] ECR 1-9579. 
It does not appear from the judgment of the Court of Justice that the consumer even mounted a defence to 
the enforcement action in national court. 
Asturcom, supra n. 87, paras 39-46. Put differently, Asturcom holds that, while a consumer who fails to raise the 
unfairness of an arbitration agreement in an arbitration does not forfeit the objection in a later annulment 
proceeding, it may forfeit the objection if it raises it for the first time when the prevailing party seeks to 
enforce the award, since by then the award was no longer subject to direct challenge and had thus become 
res judicata. 
The analysis in Asturcom under the principle of equivalence proved more difficult. Under that principle, 
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and must at some point yield to considerations of national procedural autonomy. 
But the decision does not signal any retreat on the Court's part from the 
proposition that the unfair consumer contract terms directive represents EU public 
policy and that national courts must organise the machinery of justice so as to 
ensure that the directive's purposes are achieved both effectively and in a fashion 
equivalent to comparable provisions of national law. 
fivj The Boundaries ofEU Public Policy 
Taken together, Eco Swiss, Mostaza Claro, and Asturcom clearly place certain norms of 
EU competition and consumer protection law within the category of EU public 
policy. But they also raise more far-reaching questions. 
First, do whole fields of EU law (such as competition and consumer protection 
law) fall en bloc within the domain of public policy, or do only certain norms within 
them — whether treaty provisions or legislative instruments — do so?83 The ECJ in 
fact has refrained from declaring whole fields of EU law to have a public policy 
character. This is unsurprising, considering that, for purposes of any given case 
before the Court, it is sufficient to decide whether the particular norm invoked has 
that status. 
Second, what other fields of EU law — or particular norms within those fields — 
enjoy public policy status? If EU competition and consumer protection law have 
attained that status, has EU environmental protection law, labour law or 
occupational health and safety law also done so? That prospect can hardly be 
excluded.84 For labour law, the likelihood is especially great, given the ECJ's 
repeated assertion that certain employee protections are mandatory and cannot be 
waived, either directly or indirectly.85 Whether environmental protection or 
occupational health and safety falls within this category is less certain, but surely 
cannot be excluded a priori. We may assume that fundamental human rights norms, 
including the prohibition on nationality and gender discrimination,86 must be 
conflicts with national public policy, despite the arbitral outcome having become res judicata without the 
question ever having been raised, then it must do likewise in regard to EU public policy. The Court reiterated 
in this connection that Article 6(1) of the consumer contract terms directive was a 'mandatory provision' and 
'essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the European Community and, in particular, to 
raising the standard of living and the quality of life throughout the Community' Id., para. 51. Therefore, 
Article 6(1) enjoyed the status of EU public policy. Id., para. 52 (Article 6 of the directive must be regarded 
as a provision of equal standing to national rules which rank, within the domestic legal system, as rules of 
public policy'). It remained only for the national court on remand to ascertain whether Spanish courts would 
decline to enforce an arbitral award on national public policy grounds under the circumstances presented in 
Asturcom. If they would, the principle of equivalence would require them to do likewise in the case at hand. 
On the debate whether EU competition law as a whole constitutes EU public policy, see Karydis, supra n. 39. 
The suggestion has been made that all norms of EU law that are directly applicable and directly effective are 
necessarily EU public policy norms. See, e.g. Brulard & Quintin, supra n. 52. 
Mirjajuuri v. Fazer Arnica Oy, Case C-396/07, [2008] ECR 1-08883, Opinion of Advocate-General Colomer 
of Sept. 4, 2008, para. 25; Foreningen AF Arbejdsledere IDanmark v. Daddy's Dance HallA/S, Case 324/86, [1988] 
ECR 739, para. 15. See generally Schlosser, supra n. 52, at 86. 
Schlosser, supra n. 52, at 86. It has been suggested that an EU law norm must 'contain an element of 
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protected as a matter of public policy in whatever field they arise.87 Public policy 
may also be ascribed to those liberal economic values deemed essential to the 
functioning of the integrated market that is the EU's very cornerstone. Thus, one 
leading academic considers that all norms establishing the free movement of the 
factors of production - goods, persons, services and capital — collectively constitute 
public policy.88 The contours of EU public policy will become known only 
progressively, as Member State courts consider, and occasionally ask the ECJ, 
whether a given field of EU law, or norm within that field, enjoys public policy 
status.89 The Court has already held that some EU harmonization measures do 
not constitute EU public policy, but has not clearly indicated why.90 
That the notion of public policy in private international law is nebulous has long 
been acknowledged, but that reality has been offset by a consensus that public 
policy represents a highly restricted normative category. That is appropriate, as its 
function throughout private international law - and international arbitration is no 
exception - is typically to override party autonomy or defeat enforcement of an 
otherwise applicable law or judgment. But, as developments at the EU level show, 
the notion of public policy may enjoy much greater amplitude when it is put to a 
different set of purposes. In the EU context, it performs a distinctive function 
indeed, namely, to emphasise the paramountcy of EU law vis-a-vis the law of the 
Member States. The ECJ has reason to entertain a highly robust conception of EU 
public policy for these purposes, since doing so serves to strengthen EU law's 
Racine, supra n. 41, at 227-228. Racine takes the position, however, that not every provision of the European 
Human Rights Convention enjoys public policy status. Id. at 231. According to Racine, public policy 
probably also does not tolerate corruption. 
Schlosser, supra n. 52, writes: 
The very essence of the European Communities has always been to create and to develop the five big 
freedoms of the citizens of the community: the freedom of transnational trade, the freedom to provide 
services, the freedom of movement of capital, the freedom of movement of workers and the freedom of 
establishment; if anydiing, these five freedoms are the culmination of European public policy. 
Schlosser singles out for public policy treatment the directive guaranteeing protection of commercial 
agents. Id. at 87. 
See generally, Hanna Schebesta, 'Does the National Court Know European Law? A Note on Ex Officio 
Application after Asturcom', 4 Eur. Rev. Priv. L. 847 (2010). 
In Eco Swiss, supra n. 58, the Court relied on the inclusion of competition law in EC Treaty Article 3 as 
one of the competences of the EU, but this is a dangerous line of reasoning. '[AJlmost any piece of 
Community law can claim, as an instrument providing a legal framework for EC tasks and actions, to be 
within the scope of Article 3 E C Shelkyoplas, supra n. 1, at 126. 
In van der Weerd v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit, Joined Cases C-222-25/05, [2007] ECR 
1-4233, the Court determined that a national court is not required to raise on its own motion arguments 
based on an alleged violation of Directive 85/511 governing measures to control foot-and-mouth disease. 
According to the Court: 
[T]he principle of effectiveness does not, in circumstances such as those which arise in the main 
proceedings, impose a duty on national courts to raise a plea based on a Community provision of their own 
motion, irrespective of the importance of that provision to the Community legal order, where the parties are given a 
genuine opportunity to raise a plea based on Community law before a national court. 
[2007] ECR 1-4233 (para. 41) (emphasis added). For the Court, clearly, not all provisions of EU law 
provisions have the same 'importance . . . to the Community legal order.' But see Racine, supra n. 41, at 232, 
who would place in the category of EU public policy competition policy, consumer protection, company law, 
intellectual property law and bankruptcy, adding that 'this comes close to saying that all of Community law 
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effectiveness within the national legal orders. But in that context, public policy 
cannot then be assumed to have the highly exceptional character ordinarily 
ascribed to it in private international law. 
[c] The Dilemma of Member State Courts 
In the abstract, there is no reason why two international regimes, such as EU law 
and international arbitration, cannot entertain very different notions of public 
policy. Sometimes, however, the demands of public policy as articulated in the two 
regimes cannot readily be reconciled. As the Eco Swiss, Mostaza Claro and Asturcom 
cases reveal, public policy claims can arise in judicial settings that implicate both 
EU law and the law of international arbitration, often within the borders of a single 
case before a single national court. 
In a case like Eco Swiss, first principles of international arbitration law required 
the Dutch court to give public policy, as a ground for annulment, a narrow and 
restrictive interpretation, reserving it for the truly exceptional case. At the same 
time, EU law, at least as articulated by the ECJ, required the same Dutch court to 
entertain an expansive definition of public policy and to annul any arbitral award 
within its jurisdiction that offends it. Put simply, the logic of EU law favours an 
expansive notion of public policy, while the logic of international arbitration law 
favours one that is markedly more restrictive. It is fair to ask whether, in such a 
case, the Dutch court can possibly do right by both imperatives. 
But the challenge that EU public policy presents to international arbitration 
runs still deeper. Arbitration's claims to efficiency are largely predicated on the 
notion that parties must bring all their legal claims - procedural and substantive 
alike - before arbitral tribunals rather than reserve them for ex post judicial 
challenges to unfavourable awards.91 Thus, in arbitration practice, well-developed 
principles of waiver and estoppel serve the generally salutary purpose of 
compelling parties to raise their claims on a timely basis in the arbitral forum, on 
pain of forfeiting them. However, according to cases like Eco Swiss and Mostaza 
Claro, parties may not in fact be required to lay their EU public policy arguments 
before the arbitrators in the first instance, but rather may reserve them for eventual 
judicial challenges to awards. To this extent, EU public policy - particularly one of 
wide proportions — risks disturbing the specific equilibrium on which the 
international arbitration regime's proper functioning relies. Discrepancies in the 
scope of public policy between the EU and international arbitral regimes thus 
cannot be dismissed as of academic interest only. 
III. IN T H E I N V E S T O R P R O T E C T I O N / E U LAW 
C R O S S - F I R E 
The rise of investor-state arbitration has more recently opened up a second front in 
the contest between the EU and international arbitration legal orders. In this Part, 
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I explore the tensions this confrontation is generating - tensions that differ 
markedly from those described in the previous part. As will be seen, analysis of 
these conflicts is complicated by two factors: first, the distinction between bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) between two EU Member States ('intra-EU BITs') and 
BITs between a Member State and a third country ('extra-EU BITs');92 and 
second, the fact that the EU's winning of exclusive competence over foreign direct 
investment under the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon93 raises more questions than it 
answers.94 
The tensions observable on the investor protection front derive from a simple 
reality, namely that EU law occasionally mandates that Member States take 
measures that arguably run afoul of those States' obligations to foreign investors 
under BITs, thus subjecting them to claims, and potentially very considerable 
liabilities, before investment arbitration tribunals.95 
The EU's prohibition on state aids illustrates the point. From the start, 
European Community law barred Member States from granting state aids to 
industry except when, in exceptional circumstances, the Commission authorised 
them to do so.96 The Court of Justice has pronounced such recovery of any illegal 
state aid from the recipient to be a Member State "obligation,"97 and the 
Commission enforces it energetically.98 The Commission and Court count on 
Intra-EU BITs are typically agreements entered into by a Member State with a third country prior to the 
latter's accession to the EU. Such agreements were technically extra-EU BITs, but became what are now 
known as intra-EU BITs upon the third country's accession. As discussed below, infra, notes 186-187, and 
accompanying text, the European Commission has taken the position that, upon a State's accession to the 
EU, its BITs with existing Member States are no longer valid and enforceable, unless the Commission 
specifically authorises them. This view has not commanded the support of the Member States, and may 
therefore not win the support of the Council when it comes to legislating on the matter. See infra, n. 189, and 
accompanying text. Extra-EU BITs are agreements between a Member State and a State that is not a 
member of the EU. 
Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community, 2007 OJ. C 306 Pec . 17, 2007). See more specifically TFEU, supra n. 3, arts 3(1 )(e) (making the 
common commercial policy an exclusive Union competence), 207 (making foreign direct investment a 
component of the common commercial policy). TFEU Article 207(1) reads, in pertinent part, '[t]he common 
commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly with regard to . . . . commercial aspects 
of... foreign direct investment . . . 'Article 2(1) of the TFEU defines'exclusive competence'as meaning that 
'only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so 
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.' See generally 
Thomas Eilmansberger, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties and EU Law', 46 Comm. Mkt L. Rev. 383, 387 (2009). 
See infra, notes 196-203, and accompanying text. On the subject, see generally Catherine Kessedjian, 'Le 
droit europeen et l'arbitrage d'investissement: European Law and Investment Arbitration' (201 l);Jacqueline 
Dutheil de la Rochere, 'Quel role pour la Cour deJustice', in Kessedjian, id., at 37; Stephan Schill, Arbitration 
Procedure: the Role of the European Union and the Member States in Investor-State Arbitration', in 
Kessedjian, id., at 129. 
Jan Kleinheisterkamp has identified, as among the leading BIT provisions that might well contravene EU 
law: unqualified capital transfer guarantees, prohibition of performance requirements, national or most-
favoured treatment, and respect for existing state aids. Jan Kleinheisterkamp, 'Investment Protection and EU 
Law: The Intra- and Extra-EU Dimension of the Energy Charter Treaty', 15 J. Int'l Econ. L. 85 (2012). 
George A. Bermann et al., 'Cases and Materials on European Union Law' 1043 (3d. ed. 2011). 
An order to recoup state aid is the standard remedy imposed by the Commission for the issuance of an illegal 
state aid. See, e.g., Land Rheinland-Pfalz v. Alcan Deutschland GmbH, Case C-24/95, [1997] ECR 1-1591. 
Commission Notice on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts, O.J. C 85/1 (April 9, 2009), 









orial Library user on 06 February 2020
422 Arbitration International, Volume 28 Issue 3 
Member State courts not only to perform this obligation, but also to entertain 
private damage actions by competitors and other third parties allegedly injured as 
a result of the grant of an illegal state a id ." 
On the other hand, the international investor protection regime does not always 
look kindly on the revocation of state aids, particularly when they were granted as 
an inducement to investment. State aid withdrawals can readily be challenged 
before an investor-State tribunal as in violation of a Member State's standard BIT 
obligations, including the requirement of 'fair and equitable treatment' of 
investors, guarantees of most-favoured nation (MFN) and national treatment, and 
protection from expropriation. A Member State's dilemma is manifest. At the 
same time that it is responsible under EU law for ensuring the recovery of an 
unauthorised state aid (and is subject to Commission prosecution, fines and private 
damages actions if it fails to do so), a Member State may be enjoined from doing 
so under international investor protection law principles. A State that proceeds 
with such a revocation will likely face an investment arbitration, and possibly an 
award in damages that the courts of that State, like other countries' courts, have an 
international obligation to enforce.100 While some categories of investor-State 
awards - notably those rendered under the aegis of the International Centre for 
Setdement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) - are immune to challenge in national 
courts,101 others will come in for judicial scrutiny.102 In the latter circumstance, 
law. Id., p. 5. When difficult issues of EU state aid law arise in national court proceedings, the court may seek 
an opinion from the Commission. SFEI and Others, Case C-39/94, [1996] ECR 1-3547 (para. 50). 
Commission Notice, supra n. 98, pp. 6, 11-13. Such actions may be supported by provisional remedies 
pending judgment. Id., p. 13. 
See generally, Michele Potesta, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties and the European Union: Recent 
Developments in Arbitration and Before the ECJ', 8 Law & Pract. Int'l Courts and Tribunals 225, 230 (2009); 
Eilmansberger, supra n. 93, at 387; Christer Soderlund, 'Intra-EU Investment Protection and the EC Treaty', 
24 J. InflArb. 455 (2007). 
State aid cases are not unique in this regard. See Mercuria Energy Group, Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Republic of Poland, 
Arbitration Institute of the SCC, final award rendered in December 2011, in which a Cypriot investor 
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty the manner in 
which Poland had implemented an EU directive increasing mandatory fuel reserve requirements for firms. 
Poland had imposed a fine on Mercuria's Polish subsidiary, J&S Energy S.A., for its failure to maintain 
mandatory stocks of fuel oil. The tribunal rejected all of Mercuria's claims, stating that Poland did not 
breach the obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment to Mercuria's investment in Poland, nor did 
Poland discriminate against Mercuria's investments in Poland. See 'Poland Wins Investment Treaty 
Arbitration with EU Investor; Government Sits On Growing Cache of Unpublished Rulings', Investment 
Arbitration Reporter, Feb. 7, 2012, available at http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20120207_l. 
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (ICSID Convention) does not contemplate judicial annulment actions or judicial review of awards 
upon their enforcement, and even within the internal ICSID annulment process, public policy is not an 
available defence. ICSID Convention, arts. 53-54. Presumably an EU Member state is required under 
ICSID to enforce an ICSID award even if, in substance, it is incompatible with EU law. Eugenia Levine, 
Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration', 29 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 101 (2011). But see n. 145, 
infra. 
Outside the ICSID Convention, investor-State awards are as susceptible to annulment or denials of 
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shall the Member State court sustain the award in accordance with the country's 
investment treaty obligations or reject it as offensive to EU law?103 
In fact, prior to any national court facing the challenge of squaring a State's EU 
law obligations with its investor protection obligations, an investment arbitration 
tribunal will ordinarily have been presented with that very same challenge. Recent 
years offer us several examples.104 By way of illustration, in the AES Summit 
Generation case,105 involving an intra-EU BIT, the Hungarian government had 
terminated long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) with foreign investors 
that had set prices for electricity guaranteeing those investors a return on 
investment without commercial risk. Hungary took that action pursuant to a 
decision in 2007 to reintroduce an administrative pricing scheme that it had 
abolished several years earlier, ostensibly as an inducement to foreign investors. 
Hungary reintroduced the scheme following a three-year infringement proceeding 
by the Commission, which ultimately ruled that the PPAs not only restricted 
competition in the energy sector in violation of EU law (by sheltering incumbent 
operators from competition), but effectively constituted a state aid incompatible 
with the common market.106 Under compulsion by the Commission, Hungary 
recovered from the investors the amount of revenue they earned that they would 
not have earned in a competitive market without the benefit of the PPAs. The AES 
Summit arbitration, along with others, ensued. Invoking the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT),107 AES, a U.K. company, charged that Hungary had violated various of its 
host state obligations (including the obligation to accord fair and equitable 
It has been suggested that the tension is more imagined than real because the Commission is only operating 
within an EU law framework and BIT tribunals only under international law. Wenhua Shan & Sheng 
Zhang,'The Treaty of Lisbon: HalfWay toward a Common Investment Policy', 21 Eur.J.Int'lL. 1049,1057 
(2011). But that is precisely the problem, inasmuch as Member State courts are answerable to both. 
For a full discussion, see Matthew T. Parish & Charles B. Rosenberg, 'Investment Treaty Law and 
International Law', 23 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 138, 147-152 (2012). See also Meg Kinnear, 'Transparency and 
Third Party Participation in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Making the Most of International 
Investment Agreements', paper delivered at ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD joint symposium (Sept. 12, 
2005). 
AES Summit Generation Ltd. &AES-Tuza Erbmii Kft. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22 (award 
of Sept. 23, 2010). 
The tribunal considered that the measure was taken for the legitimate purpose of reducing the excessive 
profits earned by the generators and reduce the burden on consumers, that any reasonably prudent investor 
would have contemplated the possibility of the reintroduction of administrative pricing, and that the 
measure was neither discriminatory nor a violation of Hungary's most-favoured-nation and national 
treatment obligations. Id., paras 9.3.34,9.3. The claimants brought an annulment action that was dismissed 
on the merits on June 29, 2012. 
Commission Decision C 41/05, (2008) 2223 final, 2009 O.J. L. 225/53 (June 4, 2008). AES Summit also 
challenged the Commission decision in the General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance). AES-Tisza 
v. Commission, Case T-468/08. The case is apparently still pending. But in a related case, Budapest! Eromu %rt 
v. Commission, Case T-182/09, [2012] ECR (Feb. 13, 2012), the General Court upheld the Commission's 
conclusion that the PPAs enabled power generators to enjoy economic advantages that they would not have 
obtained in a competitive market. 
2080 UNTS 95; 34 ILM 360 (1995). Article 26 of the ECT gives investors several options for submitting 
their claims against host governments to international arbitration, including the ICSID Convention, ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules, ad hoc arbitration operating under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, or 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce arbitration. See generally Thomas Walde, 'Investment Arbitration 
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treatment, to avoid unreasonable and discriminatory measures, to provide just 
compensation for expropriation and to comply with requirements of both national 
and most-favoured-nation treatment). Predictably, Hungary defended itself on the 
ground, among others, that revocation of the aid was mandated by EU law. 
Seeking to support Hungary's contention, the European Commission requested 
and was granted amicus curiae status in the arbitration.108 The Commission had 
understandable concerns, among them that investors would bring their claims to a 
BIT tribunal rather than a host State court (i.e. forum-shop), in hopes of a more 
hospitable forum.109 
In its award, the AES Summit Generation tribunal ultimately rejected the investor's 
claim on the merits, on the ground that Hungary had not in fact created in the 
investor legitimate expectations that precluded Hungary from terminating the 
PPA.110 Though plainly conscious of the dissonance between the EU law and 
investor protection law, the tribunal thus avoided having to favour one legal order 
over the other. 
IV. R E S O L V I N G T H E T E N S I O N S 
Having identified the two major lines of conflict between EU law and international 
arbitration law that have emerged in recent years, I turn now to the means that are 
(1996); Richard Happ, 'The Legal Status of the Investor vis-a-vis the European Communities: Some Salient 
Thoughts', 10 Int'lArb. L. Rev. 74 (2007); Markus Burgstaller, 'European Law and Investment Treaties', 26 
J. Int'lArb. 181 (2009). 
See generally, Eugenia Levine, supra n. 101. 
The Commission has similarly sought and obtained amicus curiae status in investor-State arbitrations 
brought against other Member States. See loan Micula, Viorel Micula and Others v. Romania, ICSID case no. 
ARB/05/20. In Micula, two Swedish investors claimed that Romania's partial withdrawal of incentives (in 
the form of tax exemption, customs refunds and subsidies) originally granted to the investors' drinks 
companies with a view to developing economically disfavoured regions of the country constituted a violation 
of the Swedish-Romanian BIT. Romania argued in its defence that, as a matter of EU state aid law, the 
benefits had to be withdrawn. On September 24, 2008, the tribunal issued an award affirming its 
jurisdiction and the dispute's admissibility, but thus far has issued no award on the merits. 
Christoph G. Benedict, 'The Multilateralization of Investment Protection under the Lisbon Treaty: Fears 
and Hopes of Investors', 24 ICSID Rev. - Foreign Investment L.J. 446, 450-451 (2009). The Commission 
probably worries not only about the inability of BIT tribunals to make preliminary references to the ECJ, 
but also about the likelihood that they will be less solicitous of EU law than a national judge would be, 
particularly when a State invokes EU law as a justification for what would otherwise amount to an 
investment treaty violation. More generally, a decentralised investor-State dispute resolution system is not 
conducive to the uniform application of EU law and policy across the Union. 
The tribunal considered that the measure was taken for the legitimate purpose of reducing the excessive 
profits earned by the generators and reduce the burden on consumers, that any reasonably prudent investor 
would have contemplated the possibility of the reintroduction of administrative pricing, and that the 
measure was neither discriminatory nor a violation of Hungary's most-favoured-nation and national 
treatment obligations. AES Summit, supra n. 105, paras 9.3.34, 9.3. The claimants brought an annulment 
action that was dismissed on the merits onjune 29, 2012. 
In a related arbitration, a Belgian energy firm initiated arbitration proceedings against Hungary for 
breach of the Energy Charter Treaty, arising out of Hungary's restructuring of its electricity power sector. 
Ekctrabel SA. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID case no. ARB/07/19. The arbitral proceedings are still ongoing. 
For still another related case, still pending, see EDF International, SA. v. Hungary, an ad hoc arbitration 
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available to decision-makers for addressing them. A traditional means of resolving 
conflicts of this sort entails reasonably straightforward exercises in 
accommodation. In this Part, I demonstrate that accommodation techniques have 
succeeded remarkably well in defusing the tensions between the ECJ's expansive 
understanding of EU public policy and the needs of international arbitration. 
Those techniques also work, but considerably less well, in reconciling the conflicts 
between EU law and the law of investor protection. In this second arena, arbitral 
tribunals on occasion have had no choice but to confront more or less directly the 
authority relationship between the competing legal regimes. 
(a) Accommodation Strategies 
Normative conflicts between international legal regimes, like conflicts between 
domestic and international legal regimes, are of course nothing new. Perhaps the 
most common way of addressing them is through one form or another of 
accommodation. In fact, there is no single accommodation strategy. Even in the 
limited interface between EU law and international arbitration law, multiple 
accommodation strategies are demonstrably at work.111 
[i] Accommodation in the Public Policy Arena 
The task of accommodating the demands of EU law with the needs of 
international arbitration has, as already noted, fallen principally to the courts of 
the Member States - notably when those courts confront claims mat an otherwise 
valid arbitral award violates EU public policy and for that reason should be 
annulled or denied recognition or enforcement.112 The Eco Swiss and Mostaza Claw 
cases served to bring this challenge suddenly to the fore.113 
Member State courts have been relatively quick to devise an accommodation 
strategy suited to this situation. The French Supreme Court decision in the Cytec 
case is illustrative.114 There, a French party that had prevailed in a contract action 
before a Belgian arbitral tribunal sought enforcement of the resulting award in 
France. The defendant resisted enforcement on the ground that the underlying 
contract stemmed from an abuse of dominant position under EU competition law. 
Conceding that the prohibition on abuse of dominant position constituted public 
policy at the EU level, the French court nevertheless ruled that its violation did not 
necessarily constitute an offence to public policy for award enforcement purposes. 
To have that effect, the violation had to have been 'flagrant, effective and 
See generally, Piers, supra n. 74. 
112 Brulard & Quintin, supra n. 52. Even in its Eco Swiss judgment, the Court of Justice admitted that review 
under the rubric of public policy 'may be more or less extensive depending on the circumstances.' Eco Swiss, 
supra n. 58, para. 32. 
113 See generally Emmanuel Gaillard, 'Extent of Court Review of Public Policy', 237 XT.LJ. (Apr. 5, 2007); 
Pierre Mayer, 'The Second Look Doctrine: The European Perspective', 21 Am. Rev. Int'lArb. 201 (2010). 
114 StiSNFSASc/ Ste Cytec Industries BV, Cass. civ. lrejune 4, 2008, Bull. civ. I no. 162, Gaz. Pal. no. 52, p. 32, 
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concrete,'115 which it evidently was not. Other courts have likewise refrained from 
annulling arbitral awards for violation of public policy where an arbitral tribunal 
issued an award that may have violated EU competition law, but did not reflect 
'manifest disregard' of that body of law.116 The accommodation technique 
employed in these cases consists essentially of reconciliation through mitigation. 
But mitigation of this sort requires something of a doctrinal shift in public policy 
analysis. At least in some contexts, it has been assumed that whether a measure 
constitutes an offence to public policy depends strictly on the character and 
content of the norm that has been violated, and more particularly on the 
importance of the values or interests that the norm embodies. It is tempting to view 
public policy, by its very nature and by the rhetoric that commonly accompanies it, 
as uncompromising, in the sense tiiat a legal norm either has public policy status or 
it does not, and if it does, it must prevail over competing considerations in all 
circumstances. 
Under the Cytec approach, however, less important than the content or character 
of the offended norm is the degree to which that norm is offended. Practically 
speaking, Cytec reflects what might therefore be called a 'norm-mitigation' strategy, 
for it directs courts to overlook violations of public policy norms, provided those 
violations are not themselves egregious. To judge by the case law that has ensued, 
courts widely view this mitigation strategy as satisfactorily resolving the normative 
conflicts that EU public policy raises in the arbitration context. 
The question that naturally arises is whether the ECJ will give its blessing to the 
relaxation of EU public policy inherent in the approach I have described. Such 
The academic commentary is generally approving. See Schlosser, supra n. 52, at 81-96; Liebscher, supra n. 
39. One authority described the inquiry into the EU law violation as 'minimalist.' Zekos, 'Antitrust/ 
Competition', supra n. 6, at 23. Another has described the approach as essentially a compromise between 
vindication of EU public policy and the finality of arbitral awards. Pascal de Vareilles-Sommieres, 'Lois de 
Police et Politiques Legislatives', 100 Rev. Crit. Dr. Ml Prive 207, 276-277 (2011). 
The New York Convention refers simply, in regard to the public policy exception to the enforcement of 
foreign awards, to an award being 'contrary to the public policy of [the country where recognition or 
enforcement is sought.' However, the Convention does not itself regulate the annulment or vacatur of awards 
made locally, even if international in character. That is a matter governed by the national law of arbitration. 
While virtually all such national laws recognise the violation of public policy as a ground for annulment, 
some specify that, to justify annulment, enforcement of an award must be 'manifestly' contrary to public 
policy. See, e.g., France's New Code of Civil Procedure, art. 1498; Dutch Code of Civil Procedure, art. 
1063; Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa, Uniform Arbitration Law 1999, 
art. 31. 
Tholes Air Defence BV v. GIE Euromissile, case no. 02/19606, 2005 Jurisclasseur 35 (Ct. App., Paris, Nov. 18, 
2004); Linde, case 08/21022 (Ct. App Paris, Oct. 22, 2009); Muovo Pignone v. Schlumberger{Ct. App. Florence, 
Mar. 21, 2006); Terra Armata v. Tensacciai (Ct. App. Milan, July 21, 2006); Latvian Republic v. JSC Latvqjas Gaze, 
no. T 6730-03 (Ct. App. Svea, Sweden). 
For a recent example, see the French Supreme Court's decision of June 29, 2011, arret no. 702. There, 
a French grain seller refused to deliver goods to a Belgian buyer because the latter's accreditation had been 
withdrawn by a decision of the EU's grain authority (ONIC). The buyer claimed breach of contract and 
sought damages in arbitration. The arbitral tribunal issued an award declaring itself without jurisdiction, 
and the buyer sought that award's annulment in French court as in violation of the principles of free 
movement of goods and freedom of establishment and services under EU law. The French Supreme Court 
found that even if the award violated EU law principles, it did not violate them in a sufficiently flagrant 
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willingness cannot simply be taken for granted, for the Court has not always 
manifested tolerance for error by Member State courts in the application of EU 
law.117 Nor has the Court always shown deference toward the claims of competing 
international regimes in conflict situations.118 However, there is reason to expect 
the Court to receive this strategy favourably, since it has shown in analogous 
settings a willingness to make comparable accommodations. 
In the Renault case,119 for example, the car manufacturer asked an Italian court 
to enforce a French court judgment in its favour against an Italian company, 
Maxicar, for losses resulting from the latter's marketing of auto parts in violation of 
Renault's industrial property rights. Maxicar argued before the Italian court that 
enforcement of the judgment would offend public policy because it was contrary to 
fundamental EU principles of free movement of goods and freedom of 
competition.120 The ECJ disagreed, insisting that the Convention's public policy 
defence be applied only when a judgment's recognition or enforcement 'would be 
at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which 
enforcement is sought' or 'constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as 
essential in the legal order of [that] State.'121 
The U.S. Supreme Court made a move of much the same sort in its landmark 
arbitration ruling in Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.122 
Though the Court granted certiorari in Mitsubishi to decide whether private claims 
under the Sherman Antitrust Act were arbitrable, i.e., legally capable of 
submission to arbitration rather than exclusively reserved for judicial 
determination, it ultimately found Sherman Act claims to be neither categorically 
arbitrable nor categorically non-arbitrable. Instead, it held that such claims could 
1 ' ' See Shelkyoplas, supra n. 1, at 12, expressing concern that the European Court of Justice might not be willing 
to give EU public policy only the scope that public policy at the national level enjoys. 'European law is used 
to asserting its application as supranational law taking precedence over conflicting national 
provisions. . . . Thus, an egalitarian treatment [of EU law] in arbitration might appear inadequate from an 
EC law perspective." Id. 
See infra, notes 168-169, and accompanying text. 
119 Regie rationale des usines Renault SA ». Maxicar SpA and Orazio Formento, Case C-38/98, [2000] ECR 1-2973. 
120 Article 27 of the then-applicable 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, supra n. 12, recognises a 'public policy' exception to a Member 
State court's obligation to enforce the civil and commercial judgments by courts of other Member States. 
12' Renault, supra n. 119, para. 30. Although in its preliminary rulings the ECJ purports to interpret but not apply 
EU law, the Court ultimately found that enforcement of a judgment for civil damages under the 
circumstances of that case, even if erroneous, 'does not constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded 
as essential in the legal order of the state in which enforcement is sought.' Id., para. 34. According to the 
Court, 'a judgment of a court or tribunal of a Contracting State recognizing the existence of an intellectual 
property right in body parts for cars, and conferring on the holder of that right protection by enabling him 
to prevent third parties trading in another Contracting State from manufacturing, selling, transporting, 
importing or exporting in that Contracting State such body parts, cannot be considered to be contrary to 
public policy.' 
The Renault case does not of course offer perfect assurances. There, the Italian court had invoked the 
public policy exception to avoid an obligation not under international arbitration law, but under EUlaiv, namely 
the obligation under the Brussels I Regulation to recognise and enforce a French judgment. Clearly, the 
Court has an interest of its own in curbing Member States' use of public policy to evade an EU law 
obligation. Even so, the case reveals an appreciation of the fact that mere errors of law or fact in the 
enforcement of an EU public policy norm need not always suffice to "activate" the public policy defence. 
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be entrusted to arbitration, but only on the assumption that the arbitral tribunal 
would not do extreme violence to the public policy norms underlying the antitrust 
laws. The arbitral tribunal must be willing to 'vindicate' the cause of action, but if 
it is, a U.S. court's role at the enforcement stage will be limited to 'ensuring] that 
the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been 
addressed.'123 Thus, the Court in Mitsubishi implicitly distinguished between 
international arbitral awards that thwart the fundamental purposes of a norm that 
is mandatory under domestic law and those that do not, suggesting that the latter, 
but not the former, could be tolerated in the interest of arbitration. Analogous 
distinctions may be found in many jurisdictions and across other fields of law.124 
In fact, the judgments in Eco Swiss, Mostaza Clara and Asturcom may all be read in 
this fashion. In both Eco Swiss and Mostaza Clara, the Court of Justice was asked 
whether national courts are required to entertain a claim alleging violation of 
competition and consumer protection law norms, respectively, even though the 
party advancing the claim in court had failed to raise it in the prior arbitral 
proceeding. In Eco Swiss, the Court managed largely to sidestep the question. But 
even in Mostaza Clara, the Court insisted merely that national courts be willing, 
even under those circumstances, to entertain the claim. The Court did not require 
that a national court reject an arbitral award on public policy grounds merely 
because a tribunal committed error — legal or factual — in adjudicating a claim of 
a public policy nature.125 Even less did it address the degree of error that a national 
court is allowed to tolerate in enforcing those norms. 
[ii] Accommodation in the Investor Protection Arena 
Another time-honoured accommodation technique is to interpret one or both of 
two potentially conflicting norms in such a way as to dispel an apparent 
contradiction between them.126 The utility of this approach is especially evident in 
'[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum, the [antitrust] statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.' 473 U.S. at 
637-638. 
By way of example, as respected a system of constitutional law as the German distinguishes between 
violations of fundamental rights that touch the 'core' of those rights and those that touch, for lack of a better 
term, their 'periphery.' See generally Matthias Mahlmann, 'The Basic Law at 60: Human Dignity and the 
Culture of Republicanism', 11 Ger. L.J. 9 (2010). 
See Shelkyoplas, supra n. 1, at. 311: 'The function of the public policy ground at this stage of the proceedings 
is not to give a judge another chance to review the merits of the case, thus correcting the award and 
achieving justice, but merely to prevent the final result of arbitral adjudication from having an effect which 
is fundamentally harmful to the forum's values.' For a similar formulation, see Christophe Seraglini, 'Lois de 
police et justice arbitrale internationale' 206 (2001). 
See International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Finalised by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, paras 37-43 (Apr. 13, 2006) 
(discussing issues of harmonization and systemic integration). See also Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31(3)(c), providing for consideration also to be given to 'any relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties' application.' 
For a discussion of the role this principle in the context of EU law and international investor protection, 
see Eilmansberger, supra n. 93, at 421; Hanno Wehland, 'Intra-EU Investment Agreements and Arbitration: 
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arbitral rulings issued in the handful of disputes pitting EU law against the law of 
investor protection. There is no reason to suppose that it will be any less useful 
when such cases make their way, as at least some will, to Member State courts. 
Consider the example of Eastern Sugar B. V. v. Czech Republic,127 another intra-EU 
case. A Dutch investor claimed that the Czech authorities violated their obligations 
of 'fair and equitable treatment' under the 1991 Czech-Dutch BIT in enacting a 
series of three pricing decrees that allegedly discriminated against the investor. As 
will be seen,128 the arbitral tribunal rejected the Czech Republic's argument that 
the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the BIT itself automatically lapsed upon 
the Czech Republic's accession to the European Union in 2004. However, the 
Czech Republic argued in the alternative that mandatory EU law principles of 
non-discrimination required it to enact the decrees, and that those principles took 
priority over the State's investment treaty obligations.129 The tribunal found that 
the Czech Republic's enactment of the first two decrees did not in any event deny 
Eastern Sugar fair and equitable treatment.130 However, the tribunal found that 
the third decree violated that right, and awarded Eastern Sugar 25 million euros in 
damages on that basis.131 Moreover, the violation could not be excused on the 
ground that the EU law principle of non-discrimination, embodied in Article 18 of 
the TFEU, justified enactment of the decree, since those principles did not in fact 
require its enactment.132 The tribunal thus avoided any suggestion that the 
EU as a Player in the BIT Arena: Current and Future Legal Challenges', 24 ICSID Rev.-For. Ins. L.J. 434, 
440 (2009); Marek Wierzbowski & Aleksander Gubrynowicz, 'Conflict of Norms Stemming from Intra-EU 
BITs and EU Legal Obligations', in International Investment Law for the 21st Century 552-553 (2009). 
Eastern Sugar B.V. (Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, Partial award, SCC no. 088/2004 (Mar. 27, 2007). The 
arbitration was conducted pursuant to the 1991 Netherlands/Czech Republic BIT, before the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, and under the UNCITRAL Rules. 
See n. 149, infra, and accompanying text. 
The Czech Republic relied for that proposition in part on two EU documents, ajanuary 13, 2006 letter 
written by the Director-General of the Commission Directorate for the Internal Market and a November 
2006 Note by the Commission, according to which: 
[Submission of investor-State disputes between an EU national and another EU Member State to 
arbitration] could lead to arbitration taking place without relevant questions of EC law being submitted to 
the ECJ, with unequal treatment of investors among Member States as a possible outcome. In order to avoid 
such legal uncertainties and unnecessary risks for Member States, it is strongly recommended that Member 
States exchange notes to the effect that such BITs are no longer applicable, and also formally rescind such 
agreements. 
Eastern Sugar, supra n. 127, para. 126. 
The tribunal ruled that, under Article 8(6) of the BIT, the law applicable to the dispute consisted of the 
substantive terms of the BIT, other applicable international agreements and general principles of 
international law. The tribunal found that the first two decrees were flawed in many respects, but not so 
much so as to deprive the investor of fair and equitable treatment. Id., paras 259-270, 274. The tribunal 
underscored that it reached this result on the basis of the BIT, and not EU law. Id. 
The tribunal found that the Czech Republic had unfairly and inequitably targeted the investor in retaliation 
for its closure of a production facility, and thus acted in a discriminatory and unreasonable manner. Id., 
paras 333-338. 
Id., paras 155-180. 
It is not surprising that the tribunal would reach that conclusion. The Court of Justice itself has held that 
non-discrimination principles of EU law do not preclude Member States from entering into a convention for 
the avoidance of double taxation even though the effect is to grant benefits to residents of those countries, 
but not to residents of third country Member States. The Court ruled that it is an inherent consequence of 
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demands of investor protection law and EU law were in conflict, much less that 
satisfying the demands of the former required disregard for the demands of the 
latter.133 
The arbitral tribunal in the case of ADC Affiliate Ltd & ADC-ADMC Management 
Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary™ made a similar move. Two Cypriot investors had 
contracted with Hungary to rebuild and operate the Budapest airport. Upon 
Hungary's issuance of a decree taking over the project, the investors instituted 
arbitration for expropriation of their property. By way of defence, Hungary 
invoked EU legislation requiring separation of traffic control from airport 
operations.135 The tribunal determined that Hungary could in fact have complied 
with the EU law mandate without taking over airport operations, and so the 
apparent normative conflict disappeared.136 Conflict can equally be avoided 
through restrictive interpretation of the demands of investor protection law. In the 
case of Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, a Dutch bank claimed that its 
legitimate expectations were frustrated by the Czech Republic's reorganization 
and privatization of the banking sector, resulting in the bank's forced 
administration and, in turn, runs on the bank. The tribunal found that the 
claimant had no reasonable basis for assuming that there would be no change in 
banking regulation in the Czech Republic, especially since in 1998, at the time the 
investment was made, alignment of Czech banking law with EU banking law could 
have been anticipated.137 Again, the conflict dissipated. 
Accommodation strategies, by definition, are highly contextual. Before 
compromising a value or interest of the legal order to which a decision-maker owes 
primary allegiance, that decision-maker will ordinarily weigh the costs and benefits 
of compromise in the long as well as the short term. An important component of 
that exercise is the decision-maker's assessment of both its vulnerabilities and those 
of the legal order to which it primarily belongs. In fact, neither the international 
arbitration legal order nor the EU legal order lacks vulnerability. In commercial 
and non-ICSID138 arbitration alike, national courts have the authority to annul or 
apply only to persons resident in one of the two Contracting Member States. D. v. Inspecteur van di 
Belastingdienst, Case C-376/03, [2005] ECR 1-5821. 
The Tribunal denied that the ECJ enjoys an 'interpretive monopoly' with regard to the meaning of EU 
law. Eastern Sugar, supra n. 127, para. 134. 
For another example, see AES Summit Generation, supra n. 105. The tribunal did not find itself paralysed by the 
apparent conflict between the requirements of EU and investor protection law. It managed to reach the 
conclusion that Hungary had not impaired the investor's interests to the point of committing a BIT 
violation. Significantly, the tribunal managed to reach this result without attaching any special weight or 
importance to the state aid policy of the EU. 
ICSID case no. ARB/03/16 (2006). 
Directive 96/97 on access to the ground-handling market at European Union airports, 1996 OJ. L 272/36. 
ADC Affiliate, Ltd., supra n. 134, para. 272. Conflict-avoidance was thus achieved in ADC Affiliate, as in the 
AES Summit case, through a restrictive reading of EU law. 
Partial award, para. 351 (Mar. 17, 2006). 
ICSID awards are in principle immune from national judicial review, either by way of annulment or denial 
of recognition or enforcement. Article 53 makes an ICSID binding on the parties and 'not. . . subject to any 
appeal or to any other remedy except those provided for in [the ICSID] Convention. Each party shall abide 
by and comply with the terms of the award except to the extent that enforcement shall have been stayed 
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deny recognition or enforcement to awards they find offensive. The legitimacy 
debates that currently surround international investment arbitration only heighten 
that risk. It is easy to imagine how challenges to the investment arbitration regime 
emanating from the EU and its Member States might spread to other parts of the 
world, especially those that from the very outset harbor doubts about its 
legitimacy. 
The EU likewise has vulnerabilities in this arena. Disrespect for international 
arbitral awards not only exacts reputational costs, but also encourages disrespect 
for awards by other actors in other circumstances. To the extent that the EU is a 
net capital exporter, its nationals figure among the putative beneficiaries of the 
investment arbitration regime, who stand to suffer from its weakening. Moreover, 
inherent in international arbitration is the fact that one country's refusal to 
recognise or enforce an award, and even its annulment of an award, leaves other 
countries entirely free to give the award whatever recognition or enforcement they 
wish. At the same time, Member States may come to be viewed as less attractive 
arbitration venues, due to the annulment risks they present. 
The mutual vulnerabilities I have described will likely operate as an incentive to 
pursuing accommodation strategies of various sorts. The complexities of the 
disputes that epitomise commercial and investment arbitration today can only 
favour the calculations and tradeoffs upon which accommodation strategies by 
definition depend. 
(b) Confronting Authority Relationships 
The previous sections reveal the considerable distance that accommodation 
techniques such as mitigation and interpretation can go in reconciling the 
demands of EU and international arbitration law. This is particularly so in 
connection with the challenges to international arbitral awards mounted in the 
name of EU public policy. But an examination of the conflicts between EU law 
and investment protection law shows that accommodation techniques have their 
limits. In this section, I demonstrate the inability of those techniques to address 
some of the conflicts that have arisen in the investor protection arena. Unable to 
accommodate the demands of the competing regimes, arbitral tribunals have felt 
compelled to effectively establish a priority between them. I first examine the 
results of that exercise thus far, while venturing thoughts on how authority conflicts 
in this arena are best resolved when conventional accommodation techniques fail. 
I then consider the impact on these tensions of the EU's achieving exclusive 
competence vis-a-vis the Member States over foreign investment law under the 
2009 Treaty of Lisbon. 
Contracting States to recognise and enforce an ICSID award 'as if it were a final judgment of a court in that 
State,' and Article 55 specifically preserves 'the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity 
of that State or of any foreign State from execution.' The latter provisions could provide an opening for a 
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fij Positioning the EU and Investor Protection Regimes 
Recent investor protection disputes reveal the limits of accommodation techniques 
in defusing conflicts between EU law and the law of international investor 
protection. Such techniques meet their limits when parties before investment 
tribunals, and eventually courts, in effect acknowledge the possibility of an 
irreconcilable conflict between international norms, and question the priority 
between the systems from which those norms emanate. That was the case in the 
AES Summit Generation dispute, discussed earlier.139 The AES Summit tribunal 
concluded on the merits that Hungary's termination of the long-term power 
purchase agreements with the claimants did not amount to unfair or inequitable 
treatment under the relevant BIT. However, Hungary also argued in that case that 
the law applicable to the investment claim was not the Energy Charter Treaty 
(ECT), but rather the law of the European Union. The tribunal rejected that view, 
stating clearly that it was the ECT that supplied the legal standards for assessing 
Hungary's actions and that EU law operated in that case as at most a legal datum 
in the application of those standards.140 The requirements of EU state aid law were 
thus certainly not irrelevant, but neither were they decisive. 
Faced with the question as framed by Hungary, the tribunal had no choice but 
to establish in effect a priority between EU law and the international law of 
investor protection, essentially in favour of the latter. For the tribunal, fundamental 
was the international law principle that 'a State may not invoke its domestic law as 
an excuse for alleged breaches of its international obligations.'141 In rejecting 
Hungary's defence that it was compelled by EU law to act as it had done in that 
case, the tribunal basically took a page from the ECJ's own playbook, according to 
which Member States cannot justify their EU law infringements by invoking 
domestic - even domestic constitutional - legal constraints.142 
Other investment tribunals that, like the AES Summit tribunal, were required to 
address the matter squarely have reached the same conclusion. In the Eastern Sugar 
See supra n. 105. 
The tribunal concluded that any obligation that Hungary may have had under EU law 'is only an element 
to be considered by this Tribunal when determining the "rationality," "reasonableness," "arbitrariness," and 
"transparency" of the reintroduction of administrative pricing .. .' Id., , paras 10.2.3, 10.3.16. 
Note that the ECT attempts itself to establish a distinctive priority between the norms. According to 
Article 16, in the event of conflict between the ECT and any other treaty dealing with the subject matter, 
the tribunal should prefer the provision that is more favourable to the investor. 
AES Summit, supra n. 105, para. 7.6.6. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n. 126, art. 27: 
A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.' 
Due precisely to the incorporation of EU law within the Member State legal orders, the constraints on 
Member States emanating from EU law are in effect their 'internal' law. 
In Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID ARB/04/15, Award (Sept. 13, 2006), a 
tribunal dismissed an investment claim brought by the Norwegian company, Telenor, against Hungary for 
expropriation and denial of fair and equitable treatment. Hungary, it was alleged, had excluded Telenor 
from a new universal service program mandated by EU law, but nevertheless imposed a levy on the 
company while excluding it from certain pricing benefits. The tribunal found that a Member state's breach 
of EU law, even if established, did not in itself establish a BIT violation. 
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case,143 the Dutch investor objected to changes in the Czech Republic's regulation 
of the sugar market - changes that the Czech Republic argued were required of it 
by the EU as part of the country's EU accession process.144 The Czech Republic, 
supported by the European Commission,145 argued that the arbitral tribunal 
lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim because the Republic's BIT obligations 
were superseded by its Treaty of Accession to the EU,146 principally invoking 
Articles 42 and 59(1) of the Vienna Convention on Treaties.147 According to 
Article 59(1): 
A Treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to 
the same subject matter and: (a) it appears from die later treaty or is otherwise established that the 
parties intended that the matter should be governed by tiiat treaty; or (b) the provisions of the 
later treaty are so far incompatible with those of the earlier one that the two treaties are not 
capable of being applied at the same time. 
In order for Article 59 to apply, the successive treaties must relate to the same 
subject matter and be incompatible. The BITs have some commonality with the 
EU principle of free movement of capital, but it may be a stretch to read the duties 
of fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, or even the guarantee 
against expropriation into the EU Treaty. In any event, the BITs provide for 
investor-State arbitration, widely regarded as an advantageous dispute settlement 
mechanism.148 The tribunal, accordingly, was righdy unpersuaded by the Czech 
Republic's arguments.149 Having upheld its jurisdiction, the tribunal in Eastern 
Eastern Sugar, supra n. 127. 
Id., para. 97. 
The Czech Republic specifically cited two EU documents: (a) a January 2006 letter from the Commission 
stating that 'intra-EU BITs should be terminated in so far as die matters under the agreements fall under 
Community competence' and (b) a note from the Commission to the Economic and Financial Committee 
- an EU advisory body - suggesting that the BIT provisions were superseded upon accession to the EU. 
Eastern Sugar, paras 119, 155. 
Like similarly situated Respondent States, the Czech Republic argued that BITs between Member States are 
definitionally incompatible with European Union law on nationality discrimination grounds. This is because 
the effect of a BIT is to guarantee nationals of a Member State benefits that nationals of third Member 
States do not enjoy. These benefits are not only substantive (e.g. guarantees of fair and equitable treatment), 
but also procedural (availability of mandatory arbitration in the event of a dispute). See Parish & Rosenberg, 
supra n. 104, at 149; Ahmad Ali Ghouri, 'Resolving Incompatibilities of Bilateral Investment Treaties of the 
EU Member States with the EC Treaty: Individual and Collective Options', 16 Eur. L.J. 806, 808 (2010). 
Vienna Convention, supra n. 126, art. 42. Article 42 provides that a treaty is terminated only according to its 
own terms or the terms of the Convention itself. Because the tribunal found that the BIT did not provide for 
its termination upon Czech accession to the EU (Eastern Sugar, paras 143-154), it turned to possible grounds 
for termination set out elsewhere in the Vienna Convention, notably Article 59. 
The Czech Republic also invoked Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, discussed more fully, infra, at 
notes 152, and accompanying text, in connection with the Eureka case, infra n. 151. The tribunal summarily 
rejected the argument. 
Eastern Sugar, supra n. 127, para. 165 (finding that 'the arbitration clause is in practice the most essential 
provision of Bilateral Investment Treaties . . . EU law does not provide such a guarantee'). See also Jan 
Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction (Apr. 30, 2010), 
para. 77 ('the EC Treaty provides no equivalent to one of, if not the most important feature of the BIT 
regime, namely, the dispute settlement mechanism providing for investor-State arbitration'). 
Eastern Sugar, supra n. 127, para. 160. The tribunal asserted the right to determine its own jurisdiction and, 
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Sugar then concluded on the merits that the State had breached its obligations of 
fair and equitable treatment, not only by disappointing the investor's expectations, 
but also by demonstrating favouritism toward Czech beet growers.150 
Similarly, in Eureko BVv. Slovak Republic,151 a Dutch health insurance company 
doing business in Slovakia complained that, following a change in government, 
Slovakia reversed the liberalization of the health insurance market upon which the 
investor had relied in entering that market. The company asserted numerous 
claims based on the relevant BIT, including indirect expropriation, denial of fair 
and equitable treatment, denial of full protection and security, and violation of the 
right of free transfer of profits and dividends. Slovakia raised a jurisdictional 
objection, arguing as other Respondent EU Member States have done, that the 
BIT was superseded by Slovakia's accession to the EU. As in AES Summit and 
Eastern Sugar, the tribunal disagreed, rejecting all of Slovakia's jurisdictional 
arguments, including ones based on Article 30 as well as Article 59 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties,152 the exclusivity of ECJ jurisdiction over 
both the Czech Republic and the EU Commission, neither the Accession Treaty nor the BIT provided for 
the latter's automatic termination once both State parties became EU Member States. Id., paras 125, 
138-145, 172. 
For still another jurisdictional award along the lines of Eastern Sugar and Eureko, see Jan Oostergetel and 
Theodora Laurentius v. The Slovak Republic, supra n. 148, paras 65-109 (holding that the applicable Dutch-Slovak 
BIT was not terminated upon Respondent's accession to the EU). 
For an approving view of the decision, see August Reinisch, Articles 30 and 59 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties in Action: The Decisions on Jurisdiction in the Eastern Sugar and 
Eureko Investment Arbitrations', 39 Leg. Issues Econ. Integr. 157 (2012). For a dissenting view, see Jan 
Kleinheisterkamp, supra n. 95. 
Member States and the EU have also invoked Article 344 of the TFEU, according to which 'Member 
States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of this treaty to any 
method of settlement other than those provided for therein.' In the case of Commission v. Ireland (Mox Plant 
case), Case C-459/03, [2006] ECR1-4635, paras 84-86, the ECJ ruled that Article 344 barred Ireland from 
bringing action against the United Kingdom under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in the tribunal established by that instrument. In the view of the Court, claims brought under 
international agreements concern the interpretation and application of the European Treaties insofar as 
they deal with matters that are the subject in large measure of EU law, and to that extent raises 'the risk that 
a judicial forum other than the Court will rule on the scope of obligations imposed on the Member States 
pursuant to Community law.' Id., para. 177. Most commentators correcdy distinguish Mox Plant from the 
BITs cases on the ground that the former was a Member State-to-Member State dispute (thus covered by 
Article 344), while the latter represent dispute initiated by a private party against a Member State (hence not 
covered by Article 344). See, e.g., Markus Burgstaller, 'Investor-State Arbitration in EU International 
Investment Agreements with Third States', 39 Leg. Issues Econ. Integr. 207, 217 (2012). For a contrary view, 
see Angelos Dimopoulos, 'The Validity and Applicability of International Investment Agreements between 
EU Member States under EU and International Law', 48 Comm. Mkt L. Rev. 63, 89 (2011). 
The tribunal in Eastern Sugar, supra n. 127 awarded the claimant 25 million euros in damages. 
Eureko BV v. Slovak Republic, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, PCA Case No. 2008-13 
(Oct. 26, 2010). 
The European Commission filed an amicus submission in the case. European Commission Observation, 
July 7, 2010, quoted in Eureko, para. 180. 
Eureko, para. 265. On Article 59, see supra, notes 147-150, and accompanying text. 
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention reads in pertinent part: 
(2) When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an 
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matters touching on EU law,153 and the fundamental principle of non-
discrimination under EU law.154 More generally, the tribunal held in effect that the 
EU may represent a new legal order for the constituent States but that, from an 
international legal perspective, it is nevertheless a subject of international law, and 
bound along with its Member States by its international engagements.155 
[iij The Role of Decision-maker Identity 
Resolution of the normative conflicts in cases like Eastern Sugar and Eureko are 
complicated by the multiplicity of players and perspectives in the investment 
arbitration arena. The international arbitral tribunals from which awards emanate 
are themselves the product of that regime and, in a very real sense, owe their 
existence to it. They are therefore likely to favour the mandates of the international 
arbitral regime when conflicts with EU law cannot be avoided. Every indication 
from the recent jurisdictional rulings of investment arbitration tribunals supports 
this prediction. 
The ECJ finds itself in a very different position, accustomed as it is to making 
success of 'the European project' its chief preoccupation. No institution has a 
stronger and more permanent commitment than the ECJ to vindication of the 
programmatic values that underlie the EU, and a greater incentive to protect its 
(3) When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty, but the earlier treaty is not 
terminated or suspended in operation . . . , the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are 
compatible with those of the later treaty. 
Article 30 thus contemplates that States are excused from compliance with particular provisions of a 
treaty when a later treaty between the same parties contains provisions with which the earlier ones are 
incompatible. The Eureko tribunal rightly found that 'there is no incompatibility in circumstances where an 
obligation under the BIT can be fulfilled by respondent without violating EU law,' and that even if there 
were one, the incompatibility would be dealt with as part of the merits and not affect the tribunal's 
jurisdiction. Eureko, paras 271-272, 277. 
Id., para. 274. The Eureko tribunal handily dismissed the Respondent's assertion that investor-State 
arbitration is itself inconsistent with EU law because Article 344 of the TFEU, supra n. 3, gives the EU courts 
exclusive competence over all claims which involve EU law, 'even for claims where EU law would only be 
partially affected'. See supra n. 151. 
Slovakia argued that extending benefits to nationals of one Member State that nationals of other member 
states would not enjoy offended the fundamental EU law principle of non-discrimination on nationality 
grounds. (The ECJ had ruled in the case of Matteucci v. Cornmunautefranfaise of Belgium and Commissariat general 
aux relations intemationales of the Cornmunautefranfaise of Belgium, Case 235/87, [1988] ECR 5589, that while 
Member States may enter into agreements with one another, the principle of non-discrimination under EU 
law requires equal treatment of nationals of third Member States, even if the agreement lies outside the 
scope of EU law and was concluded before the EC Treaty entered into force between the two Member 
States.) The Eureko tribunal rejected the argument on the ground that Member States are entirely free to 
extend to nationals of all Member States the benefits that a BIT requires them to give to nationals of the 
co-contracting Member State. In support of this view, see Nikos Lavranos, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs) and EU Law' (paper presented at ESIL Conference 2010). 
'In the view of the Tribunal, the proper framework for its analysis . . . is, in the first place, the framework 
applicable to the legal instrument from which the Tribunal derives its prima facie jurisdiction. Just as the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities has held that its own perspective is dictated by the treaties 
that established it, so the perspective of this Tribunal must begin with the instrument by which and the legal 
order widiin which consent originated . . . . That framework is the BIT and international law, including 
applicable EU law.' Eureko, supra n. 151, para. 228. The Tribunal added: 'Whatever legal consequences may 
result from the application of EU law, those consequences must be applied by this Tribunal within the 
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autonomy in determining the relationship between the EU and other actors and 
regimes on both the national and international level. The ECJ's record in 
defending its autonomy vis-a-vis these other actors is an impressive one. The Court 
has managed to win an extraordinary measure of deference from Member State 
constitutional courts, such as the German, which have pledged not to review the 
conformity of EU law with fundamental rights 'so long as' the European system -
notably through the ECJ itself- polices itself adequately in this regard.156 The 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg has largely followed suit, 
announcing and acting upon the conviction that ECJ jurisprudence can be relied 
on to vindicate adequately the human rights values to which the Strasbourg court 
is committed, in effect immunising from its review Member State measures taken 
pursuant to EU law.157 By contrast, the ECJ in the Kadi case asserted the right to 
review, and disapprove, Member State actions mandated by the United Nations 
Security Council, on the premise that the U.N. system may not be counted on to 
adequately safeguard fundamental rights as the Court conceives them.158 There is 
no reason, a priori, to assume that the ECJ will prove more deferential in principle 
to die international arbitral system than it has been to these other national and 
international legal orders, but as I argue below,159 the ECJ should seriously 
consider doing just that. 
While international arbitral tribunals and the ECJ alike have firm and well-
established allegiances, the Member States find themselves in a more delicate 
position. If a Member State is squarely confronted with a normative conflict that 
cannot be avoided, does it owe a higher obligation to EU law or to investment 
treaty law? Much will depend on how that State's judiciary integrates EU law and 
In re Application of Wiinsche Handekgeselkchaft (Solange II), Case 2 BvR 197/83. 73 BVerfGE 339, [1987] 3 
CMLR 225 (Fed. Const. Ct, 2d senate, 1st chamber, Nov. 9, 1987). Thus, the ECJ insisted that Member 
State courts refrain from reviewing the legality of Member State measures mandated by EU law, even as 
against national constitutional standards or international human rights standards. If they have any doubts in 
that regard, their only recourse is to put the question of validity to the Court itself for decision exclusively on 
the basis of EU law principles. Costa s. Ente Nazionak per I'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 
585. The supreme and constitutional courts of most of the Member States have conditionally acquiesced in 
the Court's position. 
Bosphoms Hava Yollari Turism ve Ttcaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, case no. 45036/98. [2005], Series A, no. 440, 
para. 304. The Strasbourg Court essentially announced what amounts to a presumption in favour of the 
consistency of EU law with the European Human Rights Convention. 
See also the ECJ's Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR 6079, barring the EU's joining the European Economic 
Area (EEA) because the exercise of jurisdiction by the EEA Court contemplated by that Agreement '[i]s 
likely adversely to affect the allocation of responsibilities defined in the Treaties and, hence, the autonomy 
of the Community legal order, respect of which must be assured by the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 
164 of the EEC Treaty. This exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice is confirmed by Article 219 of the 
EEC Treaty, under which Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation 
or application of that Treaty to any method of settlement other than those provided for in the Treaty' 
(para. 35). 
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, Joined Cases C-402/05P & C-415/05P, 
[2008] ECR 1-6351. Thus, acts that Member States are required to take under a UN. Security Council 
resolution are subject to review in the courts of the EU when challenged on the ground that they violate 
fundamental rights standards or otherwise offend 'the principles that form part of the very foundations of 
the Community legal order.' Id., para. 304. 
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international treaty law, respectively, into the national constitutional order. Under 
that State's constitutional design, EU law may well operate as a normative source 
to which the norms of all international legal regimes to which the State is party 
must yield.160 Alternatively, enforcement of EU law measures on national soil 
might conceivably be contingent on their compatibility with certain international 
legal norms. A strong academic current suggests that, in situations of irreconcilable 
conflict, Member State courts have no choice but to privilege the demands of EU 
law over those of other international legal orders.161 And yet, in May 2012, an 
intermediate appellate court in Frankfurt, Germany, denied Slovakia's application 
to set aside the partial award on jurisdiction in the Eureko arbitration.162 
Significandy, the court declined to make a preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice on the effect of Slovakian accession to the EU on the country's existing BIT 
with the Netherlands.163 The judgment is on appeal before the German Supreme 
This position is clearly espoused by Kleinheisterkamp, n. 95, supra, at 92-93: 
For any court of an EU member state, however, the hierarchy of norms is different and it would be 
under the obligation to refuse recognition and enforcement of such an award to the degree that it 
contradicts European competition law. Faced with the dilemma of having to choose between respecting his 
or her country's obligations under international law or preserving the integrity of the legal order of the EU 
Treaties, a judge of an EU member state is, as a matter of principle, obliged to privilege the latter. 
See Steffen Hindelang, 'Circumventing Primacy of EU Law and the CJEU's Judicial Monopoly by 
Resorting to Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Provided for in Inter-se Treaties: The Case of Intra EU 
Investment Arbitration', 39 Leg. Issues ofEcon. Integr. 179, 205 (2012); Burgstaller, supra n. 107, at 195. 
Decision of May 10, 2012, case 26 SchH 11/10 (Ct. App., Frankfurt-am-Main). 
The ECJ may have created an inconvenient precedent for itself in this regard in the form of Commission v. 
Republic of Slovakia, Case C-264/09, [2011] ECR (Sept. 15, 2011), a case that , however, concerns an 
extra-EU rather than an intra-EU BIT. In that case, a Swiss company (ATEU) in 1997 entered into a 
contract with a State-owned network operator in Slovakia ('SEPs') for the provision of electricity. Pursuant 
to that contract, ATEL paid over half of the construction costs of an electric transmission line from Poland 
to Slovakia, in return for priority access to the line for a 16-year period and a transmission fee. The 
European Commission brought an infringement action against Slovakia for having breached its obligations 
under Directive 2003/54, in particular its provisions guaranteeing third party access to transmission systems 
without discrimination among system users and requiring transmission system operators to ensure non-
discrimination as between system users. Slovakia argued that since ATEL had made important 
contributions to the construction of the transmission line, it occupied a different position from other users 
and treating it differently did not constitute discrimination. Slovakia also maintained that the contract was 
an investment protected under the Energy Charter Treaty and the BIT between Switzerland and Slovakia, 
and that the directive should be interpreted in such a way as to conform to the obligations arising under 
those agreements. 
The Advocate-General concluded that ATEL's preferential treatment amounted to discrimination 
under the directive, and considered whether such discrimination could nevertheless be justified by reference 
to Slovakia's obligations under either the ECT or the BIT. Having determined that the ECT offered 
investors no greater protection than the BIT, he focused on the latter. Admitting that the BIT could not be 
read as guaranteeing investors that the regulatory environment in which the investment was made would 
never be altered, the Advocate-General nevertheless read it as protecting them against arbitrary or 
unreasonable changes. He concluded that the change the Commission sought to impose would so 
completely destroy the consideration that ATEL had given in connection with the investment as to be 
arbitrary and unreasonable (A-G Op., para. 96), and even amount to an indirect expropriation (id., paras. 
106-107). Rather than interpret the directive in such a way as to require Slovakia to breach its BIT 
obligations, the Advocate-General invoked Article 307 of the then EC Treaty (now TFEU art. 351), 
according to which '[t]he rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded . . . , for acceding 
States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or 
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Court, which may have a difficult time, as national court of last resort, declining to 
make a preliminary reference to the ECJ. 
The fact is that while Member State courts may well feel bound under current 
law to give priority to the mandates of EU law, they can also, through an 
appropriately framed preliminary reference, invite the ECJ to revisit the matter. 
The ECJ might then well rule, along the lines of Eco Swiss,l6i that Member State 
courts must annul an international investment award, or deny it recognition and 
enforcement, if the award offends EU state aid or competition law, for example, 
and the Commission might well bring infringement proceedings against the State 
if the courts decline to do so.165 But the Court could also take a fresh look at the 
matter. 
One thing is certain. As the European Union increasingly constitutes itself a 
participant in binding international legal regimes - as if it were a nation-State, 
even though it most certainly is not — it will find itself correspondingly less 
comfortable asserting a privilege not to be bound by the authoritative rulings of 
the judicial bodies of those regimes.166 Take the European Human Rights 
Convention system, for example. The Member States, as noted, currently benefit 
from a kind of dispensation insofar as the measure for which they are under attack 
in Strasbourg was taken pursuant to EU law.167 The Strasbourg court's rationale 
was evidendy that the ECJ could be counted on to function as a surrogate 
international actor. But, under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is bound to become itself 
a full member of the European Human Rights Convention system and subject to 
its strictures. When the EU moves from being an international human rights ally of 
the ECHR system to being its subject alongside others, its claim to a special status 
within that system will be substantially weakened, if not entirely undermined. 
on to say '[to] the extent that such agreements are not compatible with this Treaty, the Member State or 
States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established.' 
The Advocate-General also addressed the question of whether, if the contract with ATEL were in 
breach of EU law, Slovakia could be required to terminate the contract in order to correct its infringement. 
He concluded that outside the public procurement area, a Member State should not be required to annul 
such a contract. To do so would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty recognised in EU law (id., 
para. 37). 
In its judgment (paras 47-72), the ECJ described Article 307 as preserving the pre-accession 
international treaty obligations of accession States. That holding obviated any need on the Court's part to 
interpret the directive restrictively so as to avoid finding a conflict between it and the BIT. 
Presumably, the ECJ would find that the ground rules governing the survival of pre-accession vary 
according to whether the BIT in question is an intra-EU or extra-EU BIT. 
See supra n. 58, and accompanying text. 
Arguably, the Commission could bring infringement proceedings against a Member State merely for paying 
such an award. See Burgstaller, supra n. 107, at 196. See also Jan Kleinheisterkamp, 'European Policy Space 
in International Investment Law', forthcoming in 27 ICSID Rev. For. Inv. L. J. (2012). 
The conflict in the Kadi case, supra n. 158, is distinguishable from those that typically arise in the investment 
arbitration arena. In subjecting the enforcement of U.N. Security Council mandates in Member States to 
restrictions based on fundamental rights in Kadi, the ECJ was not merely advancing EU policy in a field like 
state aids or competition law, but vindicating human rights interests that occupy a uniquely privileged place 
on the international plane. 
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True, the EU is already a member of the Energy Charter Treaty,168 but its 
participation in that system has not yet been tested. Were the EU to become a 
member of ICSID (or even the New York Convention), as is being contemplated at 
least in some quarters,169 any claims to special treatment under those regimes 
would likewise seem problematic, if not untenable. As a full-fledged participant in 
the international investor protection system, the EU will not be well placed to 
assert the supremacy of its internal law over its investment treaty obligations. If EU 
membership in the W T O is any indication, special status under the international 
investment regime is not in the offing. Except insofar as the EU benefits from the 
WTO's built-in system of advantages for regional economic integration 
organizations, it does not claim, and has not been given, any immunity from the 
normative demands of that system. 
It remains to be seen whether the ECJ will rally to this position, if and when it 
squarely faces eventual contradictions between EU law and the rulings of 
international investment tribunals. The fact is that, under the ECJ's existing case 
law, EU law measures are invalid and unenforceable to the extent they violate 
international agreements to which the EU is a party and whose provisions by their 
nature and specificity permit them to be invoked for that purpose.170 Moreover, 
Energy Charter Treaty, supra n. 107. According to ECT Article 38, a Regional Economic Integration 
Organization (REIO) may become a signatory member. Article 1.3 ECT defines an REIO as '[an] 
organization constituted by States to which they have transferred competence over certain matters a 
number of which are governed by this Treaty, including the authority to take decisions binding on them in 
respect of those matters.' 
The Statement filed by the EU pursuant to ECT Article 26(3) (b) (ii) provides that '[the] European 
Communities and their Member States have both concluded the Energy Charter Treaty and are thus 
internationally responsible for the fulfilment of the obligations contained therein, in accordance with their 
respective competences.' OJ L 336, 23.12.1994, p. 115. The Statement further provides that '[t]he 
Communities and the Member States will, if necessary, determine among them who is the respondent party 
to arbitration proceedings initiated by an Investor of another Contracting Party. In such case, upon the 
request of the Investor, the Communities and the Member States concerned will make such determination 
within a period of 30 days.' 
In the Statement, the EU avails itself of the right to exclude appeal to an international arbitral tribunal 
in the event the investor elects to bring its claim before a court of the European Union, rather than an 
international arbitral tribunal, in the first instance. That is the import of the EU's further declaration in its 
Statement that, in view of the availability of recourse by a foreign investor to the ECJ for vindication of its 
rights under ECT, 'the European Communities have not given their unconditional consent to the submission 
of a dispute to international arbitration or conciliation.' 
See Tom Toulson, 'Could the EU end up at ICSID?', Global Arbitration Review (Nov. 9, 2010). 
The ECJ has conceded that 'where international agreements are concluded by the European Union they are 
binding upon its institutions and, consequendy, they prevail over acts of the European Union.' Air Transport 
Association of America (ATA) v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, Case C-366/10, [2011] ECR I-
(Dec. 21, 2011) (paras 50-51). In that case, the ATA charged in U.K. court that Directive 2008/101 of the 
EU, establishing an aviation greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme, was unlawful under both 
international treaty law and customary international law. Although the ATA invoked several international 
agreements, the ECJ found that only one of them - the E.U.-U.S. Open Skies Agreement - contained 
provisions whose nature does not preclude their being invoked and that are not 'unconditional and 
sufficiendy precise,' meaning that the obligation set out in those provisions 'is not subject, in its 
implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure' (paras 53-55). The ECJ accordingly 
reviewed the directive's compatibility with the relevant provisions of the Open Skies Agreement, ultimately 
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the EU has condemned the United States precisely for flouting, or permitting its 
constituent states to flout, rulings of the International Court of Justice.171 Future 
conflicts in the investment arbitration arena will make it difficult for the Court to 
draw different lessons for the EU. 
[Hi] Looking Ahead: The Advent ofEU Competence over Foreign Direct Investment 
The 2009 Treaty of Lisbon expressly gave the EU exclusive competence over 
foreign direct investment, as a component of its common commercial policy.172 
Prior to that time, the EU neither legislated directly within the field nor entered 
itself into international investment agreements, whether in the form of BITs or 
otherwise. In principle, arbitrations resulting either from intra-EU BITs or extra-
EU BITs were of no direct concern to the EU. 
This does not of course mean that a Member State's conduct in the foreign 
investment field could not infringe EU law. In the EU system, Member States are 
not permitted to act in any field in a way that offends applicable EU law and policy, 
including such key transversal principles as the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital.173 Thus, even prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission 
brought successful infringement proceedings against Austria,174 Sweden175 and 
Finland176 on account of provisions in several of their BITs guaranteeing investors 
the free and immediate transfer, in freely convertible currencies, of all payments 
due in connection with investments.177 The Court of Justice upheld the 
Commission's complaint that such guarantees ran afoul of Treaty provisions 
entitling the Council, under stated circumstances, to restrict the free movement of 
capital and payments between Member States and third countries.178 
Brief of Amici Curiae, The European Union and Members of the International Community in Support of 
Petitioner in Jose Ernesto Medellin v. Doug Dretke, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, on writ of certiorari 
to the United States Supreme Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (case no. 04-5928) ('The United States 
and Member States of the EU are party to the United Nations Charter. Respect for ICJ judgments by States 
that are party to litigation is a basic principle of the international legal order'). 
Treaty of Lisbon, supra n. 93. 
Besides enabling the EU, going forward, to enter into new investment treaties and to occupy die front 
line in defending investor protection claims, the Lisbon Treaty authorises the EU to formulate an 
autonomous foreign direct investment policy. The EU may accordingly adopt legislation establishing a 
Union-wide set of policies for both inward and outward foreign investment protection. It is not yet clear 
what policy instruments the EU will develop pursuant to this authority. Marc Bungenberg, 'Centralizing 
European BIT Making under the Lisbon Treaty' (paper presented at 2008 Biennial Interest Group 
Conference, Washington DC, Nov. 13-15, 2008), pp. 15-16, available at http://www.asil.org/files/ 
ielconferencepapers/bungenberg.pdf. 
Wolker, supra n. 126, at 435-36 (2010). 
Commission v. Austria, Case C-205/06, [2009] ECR 1-1301. 
Commission v. Sweden, Case C-249/06. [2009] ECR 1-1335. 
Commission v. Finland, Case C-l 18/07, [2009] ECR 1-10889. 
On the cases, see Burgstaller, supra n. 107; Benedict, supra n. 109. 
TFEU, supra n. 3, arts 64, 66 and 75, previously EC Treaty, arts 57(2), 59 and 60(1). The Commission has 
sought to minimise such occurrences by requiring accession States, as a condition of accession, to 
renegotiate treaties with third countries to eliminate incompatibilities with EU law. See generally Anca 
Radu, 'Foreign Investors in the EU - Which 'Best Treatment? Interactions between Bilateral Investment 
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The question naturally arises whether the tensions described in this section will 
be altered by the Lisbon Treaty's having made foreign direct investment an 
exclusive EU competence.179 Stricdy speaking, the Lisbon Treaty's grant of 
exclusive competence to the EU over foreign direct investment has no relevance to 
intra-EU investment, inasmuch as such investment by definition does not fall 
within the scope of the common commercial policy.180 Still, for all the reasons that 
the EU and respondent Member States have advanced in the investment 
arbitrations discussed here, the European Commission contemplates that all 
existing intra-EU BITs will be terminated or, at least, be allowed to lapse.181 Until 
such time as that occurs, however, they will continue to give rise to investment 
disputes of the sort seen in recent years.182 Although it has been suggested that the 
EU should already start developing, in place of the intra-EU BITs, even more solid 
forms of protection for intra-EU investments than already exist, whether it will do 
so remains to be seen.183 
Turning to extra-EU BITs, it is not yet fully clear how the EU will exercise its 
newly acquired competence,184 or the extent to which it will authorise the Member 
States - as it may under EU constitutional law185 - to continue acting within that 
sphere by way of delegation. In July 2010, the Commission issued a proposed 
regulation that, while affirming the Union's exclusive competence, would subject 
the continuation of existing Member State BITs with third countries to 
Commission review and authorisation, and even permit the States to negotiate and 
See supra n. 93, and accompanying text. See generally, Kessedjian, supra n. 94; Schill, supra n. 94, at 144-147. 
The common commercial policy covers only relations with third-countries. Accordingly, it is generally 
agreed that nothing in the EU's new competence over FDI results in automatic termination of the intra-EU 
BITs, though Member States are expected not to enter into any new ones. Shan & Zhang, supra n. 103, at 
1068. 
European Commission letter of Jan. 13, 2006, quoted in Eastern Sugar, supra n. 127, para. 119. It is generally 
agreed widely thought that the EU's new FDI competence does not automatically terminate intra-EU BITs, 
though it does bar Member States from entering into new ones. Shan & Zhang, supra n. 103, at 1068. On 
the other hand, BITs commonly provide that, in the event of a unilateral (as opposed to negotiated) 
termination of a treaty, investments made prior to the denunciation continue to enjoy treaty protection for 
a period of years, usually ten to fifteen. Potesta, supra n. 100, at 235. 
It has been estimated that BITs between Member States and third-party States exceed 1300 in number, i.e. 
nearly half the total number of BITs world-wide. Shan & Zhang, supra n. 103, at 1054-1055. 
See Lavranos, supra n. 154, at 23, contemplating not only legislative action, but the possible creation of a 
specialised European investor protection tribunal. 
See generally Rudolf Dolzer, 'The European Approach to BITs', 24 ICSID Rev. - Foreign Investment L.J. 368 
(2009); Markus Burgstaller, supra n. 149; Bungenberg, supra n. 172; Benedict, supra n. 109; Schill, supra n. 94, 
at 138-143;Julien Chaisse, 'Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment: How 
will the New EU Competence on FDI AfTect the Emerging Global Regime?', \bj.lnfl Econ. i . 51 (2012); 
Note, 'Bilateral Investment Treaties and the EU Legal order: Implications of the Lisbon Treaty', 35 Brook. J. 
MIL. 851,854(2010). 
The Union's exclusive competence does not in principle bar the EU from authorizing continuing Member 
State activity in the field in question. See generally Koen Lenaerts & Piet van Nuffel, 'Constitutional Law of 
the European Union' (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2005). For a recent circumstance in which the EU delegated 
to the Member States authority to act in areas otherwise subject to exclusive EU competence, see Regulation 
662/2209 of the Parliament and Council of July 13, 2009, Establishing a Procedure for the Negotiation and 
Conclusion of Agreements between Member States and Third Countries on Particular Matters Concerning 
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enter into new ones, though only subject to Commission approval.186 While 
existing extra-EU BITs would therefore not automatically terminate, they would 
have to be modified to eliminate incompatibilities with EU law.187 In its reading of 
the proposed legislation, the European Parliament substantially reduced the 
Commission's power over existing extra-EU BITs, making its review and 
authorisation mandatory only in certain circumstances.188 In fact, the 
Commission's power stands only to be weakened further when the proposal comes 
before the Council, in which Member State views dominate, since the prevailing 
view among the States is that existing extra-EU BITs remain in force until the EU 
itself enters into investment agreements (or investment chapters in free trade 
agreements) that would replace them.189 Meanwhile, debate over whether the EU 
should even develop its own model BIT is already well underway.190 Thus, while 
Proposal for a regulation establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements 
between Member States and third countries COM (2010)344 final (July 7, 2010) , 2010/0197 (COD). 
Under the proposal, the Commission may deny or revoke authorizations if it finds in the agreements 
incompatibilities with EU law, overlaps with existing EU agreements with third countries, or obstacles to the 
development and implementation of an EU investment policy. To this end, Member States would have to 
submit the texts of proposed new BITs to the Commission for review prior to signature. 
The proposal drew initial support from the Council. Council of the European Union, Conclusions on a 
Comprehensive European International Investment Policy (Luxembourg, Oct. 25, 2010). The European 
Parliament proposed certain amendments. Position of the European Parliament, doc. No, EP-PE_TC1-
COD(2010)0197 (May 10, 2011). For the Parliament's report on the matter, see COM (2010) 0344-C7-
0172/2010-2010/0197 (COD) (April 14, 2011). 
For background on the proposal, see Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 
'Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy,' COM (2010) 343 final (July 7,2010). 
This is consistent with both the Vienna Convention, supra n. 126, and EU law. Article 30(4) of the 
Convention states 
When the parties to [a] later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one: . . . (a) as between a 
State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are 
parties governs their mutual rights and obligations. 
Similarly, TFEU, supra n. 3, art. 351 (ex ECT Article 307) states: 
The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding 
States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States, on the one hand, and one 
or more third countries, on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties. To the extent 
that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the Member State or States concerned shall take 
all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, where necessary, 
assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude. 
European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States 
and third countries, plenary sitting, (COM(2010) 0344 - C7-0172/2010 - 2010/0197(COD)), Committee 
on International Trade, Rapporteur Carl Schlyter, A7-0148/2011 (Apr. 4, 2011). See also European 
Parliament: Press release: Bilateral investment treaties: Limiting the Commission's authority (May 10, 
2011), available at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20110509IPR18971/ 
html/Bilateral-investment-treaties-limiting-the-Commission's-authority>. 
For a more detailed account, see Yulia Levashova, 'Public Interest Norms in the European International 
Investment Policy: A Shattered Hope?', University of Oslo Faculty of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper 
Series, no. 2012-08 (June 13, 2012), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083475>. 
See Kleinheisterkamp, supra n. 165. 
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the EU may eventually become the sole party on the European side to BITs with 
third countries,191 the Member States remain for now very much in the picture. 
In June 2012, the Commission published a proposal for managing financial 
responsibility arising out of investor-State arbitration,192 under which financial 
responsibility flowing from an award would be borne, as between the EU and the 
Member States, by the actor responsible for the treatment that gave rise to liability. 
The most interesting, but by no means rare, scenario is one in which Member 
State action produced the harm, but the action was mandated by EU law, as when 
EU competition law ostensibly required termination of the long-term power 
purchase agreements at issue in the AES Summit case.193 In this event, the EU alone 
would act as defendant and ultimately bear any financial responsibility. Where the 
offending measure was not required by EU law, both responsibilities would rest 
with the Member States, though even then, the Commission might determine that 
it is in the interest of the EU to conduct the defence. 
Under the Lisbon Treaty's new arrangements, the question of Member State 
compliance with investment treaty obligations will recede, while the question of 
the EU's own compliance with those obligations will come to the fore. 
Accommodation techniques, such as mitigation and interpretation, will play as 
important a role as they have up to now. But what may well change is the EU's 
view of its relationship to the international investor protection regime. As noted,194 
once the EU subjects itself directly, as participant, to that regime, it will have 
heightened difficulty in insisting that its internal norms - even tfiose of a public 
policy nature - take precedence over its investment treaty obligations. 
V. C O N C L U S I O N 
EU law and international arbitration law have long had their respective 'first 
principles,' each developing its own in largely splendid isolation from the other's. 
For its part, the international arbitral regime is guided by concerns deemed 
paramount in that particular setting. These concerns are both institutional (as in 
the notion that the public policy defence to the enforcement of arbitral awards is 
to be narrowly construed) and substantive (as in enforcement of the principle of 
fair and equitable treatment of investors). At the same time, the ECJ attaches 
equally paramount importance to ensuring EU law's effectiveness within the 
For this to come about, the Energy Charter Treaty, supra n. 107, to which at present both the EU and the 
Member States are parties, would need to be renegotiated. This raises in turn the prospect of EU accession 
to ICSID and/or the New York Convention. (EU membership in ICSID is not currently possible since the 
EU is not a State). 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for 
managing financial responsibility linked to investor-State dispute settlement tribunals established by 
international agreements to which the European Union is a party. COM(2012) 335 final. 
AES Summit, n. 105, supra. By comparison, when the then European Community signed the Energy Charter 
Treaty in 1998, the Commission issued a statement that the Communities and the Member States would 
determine between themselves, on a case-by-case basis, which of them would be the respondent party in any 
ECT arbitration. See supra n. 168. 
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national legal orders, deploying the notion of EU public policy as an important 
instrument in that effort, to the point of imbuing whole swaths of EU law with a 
public policy dimension.195 The pattern is already well documented in the 
competition law and consumer protection fields, and promises to extend further. 
It is small wonder, then, that the EU and international arbitration legal orders 
harbour public policy notions of strikingly different amplitude,196 and that each 
regards maintaining its favoured amplitude as critical to its own success. As the 
connectedness between the two regimes becomes more evident, however, 
important fault lines are coming into view, as when a broadly conceived EU public 
policy renders international arbitral awards far more susceptible to annulment, 
non-recognition and non-enforcement than first principles of international 
arbitration law normally allow. The dissonance is felt most palpably by Member 
State courts, as they stand directly in the cross-fire between the demands of EU 
public policy, on the one hand, and the duty to affirm and enforce international 
arbitral awards, on the other. 
The investor protection cases show that Member State courts are not, however, 
alone in this regard. Any conscientious investment arbitration tribunal itself, 
though firmly anchored in the international arbitration rather than the EU legal 
order, also experiences the dissonance. Even while examining an investor 
protection claim under international law (whether a BIT, the Energy Charter 
Treaty or general principles of international law), rather than EU law, a tribunal 
cannot help but take the demands of EU law into account in determining whether 
a State's apparent breach of an investment treaty obligation may somehow be 
justified. The state aid revocation cases provide the clearest examples, but others 
are in the offing. Conversely, the ECJ, while sitting at the apex of the EU legal 
order, must recognise the legitimate claims that emanate from other international 
legal regimes, including the regime of international arbitration. 
The natural response in such situations is one of accommodation. Time-
honoured strategies of accommodation have proven their worth as means of 
managing the resulting normative friction. All the adjudicatory bodies that are 
implicated - whether arbitral tribunals, national courts, or the ECJ itself- have in 
their arsenal mitigation techniques and canons of construction that enable them, 
within limits, to resolve normative conflicts. Member State courts have contributed 
to this process by recognizing that EU public policy is not violated, for award 
annulment purposes, in every circumstance in which a court or tribunal fails to 
fully respect a norm to which the EU legal order attributes public policy status. It 
only remains for the ECJ to relax the dictates of EU public policy to the extent of 
allowing Member State courts to follow such mitigation practices. For their part, 
See F.-B. Weigand, 'Evading EC Competition Law by Resorting to Arbitration', 9 Arb. Int'l 249 (1993). 
Maud Piers, supra n. 74. See also Shelkyoplas, supra n. 1, at 15: 'Not surprisingly, neither of the standpoints 
[i.e., EU law or arbitration] leads to a constructive solution of the possible tensions inherent in the relations 
between arbitration, with its private-procedural character, and EC law, with its public-substantive nature, 
for they each lack an understanding of the other's underlying fundamental principles and objectives.' Put 
differently, 'it is not the infringement of law itself but the actual effect of the infringement seen through the 
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investor-State arbitral tribunals have likewise demonstrated a capacity to 
accommodate norms emanating from both the EU and investor protection 
regimes. Accommodation techniques play a vital role in a world populated with 
multiple international legal orders and multiple first principles. 
To the extent they succeed, accommodation techniques permit courts and 
tribunals to avoid prioritizing between competing legal regimes. But they do not 
always succeed. Moreover, conflicts are sometimes framed not as a contest between 
norms, but rather as a contest between legal orders. Investment tribunals have not 
thus far shied away from prioritizing the demands of investor protection law over 
those of EU law when conflicts emerge and cannot be otherwise resolved. National 
courts have not yet spoken squarely to the issue, though they soon enough will. 
The Lisbon Treaty's conferral on the EU of exclusive competence in the foreign 
direct investment field makes the EU an even more conspicuous participant in the 
international investor protection regime. As the EU becomes an ever more integral 
and active member of the international investment community, it will become less 
comfortable requiring, or even permitting, Member State courts to subordinate 
their obligations under international investment law and arbitration to policies 
internal to the EU. If so, the ECJ may well be led to cede authority to the 
international investment legal regime to a much greater extent than it has thus far 
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